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February 2015  
Based on the findings of the Global 2013 Project, the War Gaming Department, at the request of 
the Air-Sea Battle Office and Chief of Naval Operations, undertook a year-long effort to 
examine four emerging command and control attributes designed to improve our ability to 
execute cross-domain operations in future high-intensity anti-access, area-denial environments. 
This report was prepared by the War Gaming Department faculty and documents the findings of 
these efforts. 
The War Gaming Department conducts high quality research, analysis, gaming, and education to 
support the Naval War College mission of preparing future maritime leaders and helping to 
shape key decisions on the future of the Navy. It strives to provide interested parties with 
intellectually honest analysis of complex problems using a wide range of research tools and 
analytical methodologies. 
The War Gaming Department is located within the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the U.S. 
Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. It was first established in 1887 by Lieutenant 
William McCarty-Little. The views expressed in this work are those of the War Gaming 
Department and do not represent the policy or position of the Department of the Navy, 
Department of the Defense, or the U.S. government. This work was cleared for public release; 
distribution is unlimited. Please direct any inquiries or comments on the substantive content of 
this document to the project director, Professor Don Marrin, at 401-841-2246 or 
don.marrin@usnwc.edu. 
 
 
 
 
David A. Della Volpe 
Chairman 
War Gaming Department 
U.S. Naval War College 
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I. Introduction 
OVERVIEW 
At the direction of the Air Sea Battle (ASB) Office, and with the concurrence of the Chief of 
Naval Operations, Global ’14 continued to focus on the Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Concept. While 
Global ’12 looked at the war fighting implications associated with concept implementation, 
Global ’13 and Global ’14 examined the command and control (C2) of cross-domain operations 
(XDO) in future Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) environments.1 After evaluating the three 
possible C2 structures developed in Global ’13 – a functional component commander based 
model, a “Domain Commander” based model, and a “Cross-Domain Commander” based 
model – a fourth “hybridized” system was proposed using the current functional component C2 
structure incorporating specific features identified during Global ’13. This hybrid C2 system was 
examined and refined during the February 2014 Global ’14 C2 Workshop, resulting in the 
following 4 C2 attributes: 
? A Combined Joint Force Information Component Commander (CJFICC) 
? A Combined Joint Force Sustainment Component Commander (CJFSCC) 
? Cross-Domain Operations Coordination Elements (XDOCEs) 
? Combined Joint Task Units (CJTUs) 
The results of the workshop were provided to a Joint Writing Team, which produced a draft Joint 
XDO C2 Concept of Operations (CONOPS). The Global ’14 War Game examined the 
implications for C2 authorities and processes as a result of integrating the four new C2 attributes 
with today’s C2 structure. The results of this effort were designed to inform the refinement of the 
draft CONOPS.  
STATEMENT OF THE SPONSOR’S PROBLEM 
Current service or component-centric C2 structures at the operational level of war may be 
inadequate to effectively execute XDO as envisioned by the ASB concept. While the ASB 
concept outlines the need to command and control cross-domain operations which are joint, 
networked, and integrated, no organizational structure is proposed; only the requirement that any 
suitable structure must be capable of tight, real-time coordination. 
                                                
1 The Global ’12 Project Report is classified SECRET//NOFORN. Organizations desiring to obtain a copy should 
contact the game director (Prof Don Marrin) via SIPRNET e-mail at don.marrin@nwc.navy.smil.mil. 
The Global ’13 Project Report is UNCLAS and can be obtained from the U.S. Naval War College Internet web site 
at https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/Research---Gaming/War-Gaming/Documents/Publications/Game-
Reports/Global-13-Game-Report.pdf.aspx. 
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The ability to conduct XDO in a communications degraded or denied environment requires 
commanders to exercise authority and direction over assigned and attached forces in real time 
while critical information, systems and services are reduced or prevented. To attain the level of 
speed and coordination required to outpace the adversary, a commander must be able to direct 
and control actions in the air, sea, land, space and cyberspace without having to work through 
parallel chains of command. Joint and allied consensus at Global ’13 was that an evolutionary 
(not revolutionary) approach will be the most effective in addressing the challenge of C2 in an 
A2/AD environment. The assumption is that XDO will be enhanced by the four C2 attributes 
contained in the draft XDO C2 CONOPS. 
First, the current Joint Task Force (JTF) structure is focused on coordination and unity of 
command at the operational level of war. Tactical unity of effort between forces relies 
predominately on tactical control (TACON) or short-term support arrangements between forces. 
Commanders detecting and reacting to changes at the tactical level must submit requests up 
through their service/functional channels when changes must be made which fall outside the 
narrow authorities they have been provided via TACON or support relationships. While this 
process has been streamlined by technology and decades of experience, it is heavily reliant upon 
assured communications. In a degraded or denied communications environment, commanders at 
the tactical level will need to coordinate XDO in order to seize and maintain the initiative while 
maintaining unity of command and effort. The integration of air, land and maritime C2 
organizations requires - at a minimum - common procedures, interoperable communication 
systems, and shared education, training and experience. Two of the proposed C2 attributes 
address this issue: the XDOCE and the CJTU. 
Second, the air, land and maritime environments have functional component commands 
established by the JTF Commander and a link to the Joint Force Component Command for 
Space. The increased importance of the space and cyber domain, and the growth of forces that 
can operate in those domains, require a functional commander to execute operations on par with 
the traditional Land Component Commander (LCC), Air Component Commander (ACC), and 
Maritime Component Commander (MCC) and to push control of those operations from the JTF 
staff or higher headquarters down to the tactical warfighting level. In order to draw all the 
information resources from across the domains and employ them as envisioned in the Joint 
Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations Concept and the Navy’s concept of Electromagnetic 
Maneuver Warfare, the idea of an Information Component Commander (ICC) has been 
proposed. 
Third, the logistically intensive nature of projecting force against advanced adversary A2/AD 
capabilities requires the ability to sustain distributed and dissimilar forces operating in multiple 
contested locations throughout the joint operating area (JOA). This problem is compounded 
further when decision-making must occur in a time-constrained environment. Various factors 
complicate the JTF Commander’s integration effort, such as competing demands for high-
priority capabilities (e.g., intra-theater lift, air ports of debarkation (APODs)/sea ports of 
debarkation (SPODs), etc.) and the fact that joint force components have different function-
oriented approaches, procedures, and perspectives. As a result, a Sustainment Component 
Commander (SCC) is envisioned to provide unity of effort for operational sustainment within the 
JOA in a contested communications environment. 
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STUDY PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES 
The purpose of the Global ’14 Project is to inform the development and refinement of a Joint 
XDO C2 CONOPS that describes how to command joint forces while executing cross-domain 
operations in future high-intensity A2/AD environments. 
Game objectives were used to drive game design and play. The two primary objectives for 
Global ’14 were as follows: 
? Identify any strengths and weaknesses of the four new C2 attributes (SCC, ICC, 
XDOCE, CJTU) using established criteria against a near-peer competitor in a high 
intensity A2/AD environment; and  
? Identify improvements to the draft CONOPS and new Mission Essential Tasks (METs). 
4 
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II. Research Methodology and Game Design 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Based on the sponsor’s interest in exploring XDO C2, and after extensive review of related 
literature, the following research questions were developed for this game:   
1. Based on the six C2 criteria employed in this game, how, if at all, does the integration 
of the four new C2 attributes (SCC, ICC, XDOCE, and CJTU) strengthen or weaken 
the ability to C2 combined forces conducting XDO in a high-intensity A2/AD 
environment? 
2. What new authorities, processes, responsibilities, and mission essential tasks are 
required of the four new C2 attributes in order to plan, direct, monitor, and assess 
XDO in a high-intensity A2/AD environment? 
3. In what ways does the integration of the four new C2 attributes impact current 
command and control authorities, processes, and responsibilities at the task force 
(Tier 2), component (Tier 3), and the task unit (Tier 4) levels of command?  
DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS 
The four terms defined below provided the foundation for the research methodology and game 
design employed in this game:   
Anti-Access (A2): Those actions and capabilities, usually long-range, designed to prevent 
an opposing force from entering an operational area. 
Area-Denial (AD): Those actions and capabilities, usually shorter-range, designed not to 
keep an opposing force out, but to limit its freedom of action within the operational area. 
Cross-Domain Operations (XDO): The use of capabilities in one or multiple domains to 
reduce risk and gain or maintain access in another domain. 
Command and Control (C2): The exercise of authority and direction by a properly 
designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the 
mission. 
Player review of the four attributes was guided by a common set of criteria which were derived 
from the Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) and Milan Vego’s Joint Operational 
Warfare Theory and Practice, and subsequently refined and applied during the Global ’13 
Project. The resulting criteria consisted of the following: 
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Unity of Effort: The C2 construct ensures that all execution decisions and apportionment 
requests remain aligned with the operation’s mission and commander’s intent. The 
organizational structure fosters a sense of cohesion and unity of purpose from planning to 
directing to monitoring to assessing. 
Flexibility: The C2 construct is broadly adaptable to a wide range of regions and tasks. 
The organization can expand or contract with changing circumstances without serious 
loss of effectiveness. It is able to respond to changes in mission and resources. 
Information is acquired and passed quickly and reliably to help build the situational 
awareness of subordinate, superior and adjacent commands. It exercises decentralized 
execution, delegates specific defined functions, and rapidly deploys forces to meet 
specific situations. 
Simplicity: Chain of command is clear and straightforward. Responsibilities and 
authorities are clearly delineated with no overlap. Subordinate commands are responsible 
to no more than one superior at any given time. Processes and procedures are 
straightforward and foster clear direct communication. 
Resiliency: The positive ability of the C2 system or a specific organization to adapt and 
overcome setbacks and fill important positions quickly and satisfactorily. This robustness 
is also a function of the number of command layers, degree of centralization vs. 
decentralization, and reliability of supporting C4ISR systems under degraded, denied or 
hostile communications environments. 
Operational Integration: A C2 system capable of directing and coordinating high tempo, 
distributed, synchronized operations characterized by the use of mission command-type 
orders, and decentralized planning and execution at the lowest possible levels across the 
force, regardless of service, nationality or physical distances, concentrating their efforts 
seamlessly. 
Cross-Domain Synergy: A C2 system capable of leveraging capabilities in different 
domains such that each enhances the strengths and compensates for the vulnerabilities of 
the others in order to establish superiority in some combination of domains that will 
provide the freedom of action required by the mission. A high degree of situational 
awareness and battle-space sense-making is a necessary enabler. 
ANALYTIC METHODOLOGY  
As an applied research and evaluation project, the game design for Global ’14 focused on 
generating new knowledge related to the strengths and weaknesses of the four C2 attributes, as 
well as any changes related to C2 authorities, processes, roles and responsibilities and 
organizational composition of the these attributes and today’s C2 structures. Consistent with 
Cherry Holmes (1992) and Morgan (2007)2, this approach is interested in identifying the ‘what’ 
and ‘how’ of potential solutions to real world problems (Patton, 1990), understanding different 
expert opinions (Creswell, 2009), and using different forms of data collection and analysis to 
corroborate results (Merriam, 2009).  
                                                
2 Notes on Pragmatism and Scientific Realism; Cleo H. Cherryholmes from Educational Researcher, Vol. 21, No. 6 
(Aug. - Sep., 1992), pp. 13-17; and Morgan, D. L. (2007). Paradigms lost and pragmatism regained. Methodological 
implications of combining qualitative and quantitative methods. Journal of Mixed Methods Research, 1, 48 – 76. 
Research Methodology and Game Design 
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A qualitative methods design was used to answer the three central research questions. This study 
used triangulation through two or more different data collection and analysis methods to 
integrate and confirm findings (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010). This approach commonly employs 
distinct quantitative and qualitative methods as a means to compensate for the weakness of one 
method with the strength of another. Much of the strength of this approach comes from being 
able to draw the same or similar conclusions using different datasets and methods (Creswell, 
2009).  
Two forms of data analysis were used to describe the qualitative and quantitative data collected 
in the study. Qualitative data collected from game tool forms and chat, cell out briefs, Web-IQ 
threaded discussion, ethnographic notes and open-ended survey responses relied on content 
analysis and grounded theory to discern underlying patterns and themes in the data. Selective, in-
vivo and serendipitous coding with ATLAS.ti software was used with these data. Using the co-
occurrence function within the software allowed the game analysts to determine the correlation 
between terms and generate game themes and insights. Descriptive analysis of quantitative data 
was used to describe the nominal and ordinal measures derived from individual player 
questionnaires, ground truth data and player product forms. Statistical analyses of these questions 
were conducted using the Analysis ToolPak functions in Microsoft Excel 2010. Qualitative and 
quantitative data were analyzed concurrently and then integrated in the interpretation of the 
overall results. 
GAME DESIGN  
Global ’14 was a 1 ½-sided, open intelligence C2 game and used an action-reaction format, 
similar to a game of timed chess, with each side acting and reacting in an alternating, sequential 
fashion. Whereas Global ’12 focused on the interaction of combat forces, Global ’14 was 
designed to address COMMAND – the legal authority exercised over attached and assigned 
forces, and CONTROL – the ability to direct the actions of those forces. The Global ’14 analytic 
agenda and research objective had nothing to do with the outcome of tactical engagements; 
rather it concentrated on the process by which the orders that directed tactical engagements were 
drafted, prioritized, resourced, coordinated, communicated and assessed. 
A synthetic region known as “Bartland“ was created specifically to support Global ’14. The 
region was NOT modeled after any particular real-world geography; rather it contained features 
conducive to the investigation of A2/AD challenges (e.g., time, space, and force). The region 
contained five countries – Red, Brown, Green, Gray and Purple – representing a spectrum of 
military capability and industrial development, and NOT any real-world countries. Australia, 
Canada, Great Britain, Japan and the US were collectively referred to as the Blue Coalition, or 
simply Blue. Red was the region’s hostile military peer to Blue; Green was the most industrially 
advanced and closely supported Blue, while Brown, Gray and Purple reflected varying lesser 
degrees of development and support.  
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Figure ?: Bartland 
Global ’14 had multiple layers of command, from the Tier 2 Task Force Commander to the Tier 
3 Component Commanders to the Tier 4 Task Unit Commanders. Task orders, drafted by Tier 3 
based on Tier 2 direction, were transmitted to Tier 4 commanders, interpreted and executed. The 
results of those combat interactions were determined in real time by umpires using a rigid, rules-
based adjudication model and witnessed by the task unit commanders, who then sent post-turn 
reports back up their chain of command. For Tier 2 and 3, Bartland was represented by a 
computer display showing force disposition (though potentially time-late). For Tier 4, the players 
were gathered around a large 30' x 36' elevated game map with foam core OOB ‘pucks.’ This 
game map represented ground truth.  
The C2 System for Global ’14 consisted of two “layers.” A Process Layer, consisting of activities 
and pathways to create turn products, interwoven with a Command Layer, composed of command 
nodes and the associated authorities and relationships. The specific command nodes and associated 
processes were determined using the results of Global ’13 and the draft XDO C2 CONOPS. 
Global ’14 gave players the opportunity to experiment with different levels of command delegation. 
For the purpose of game play, command authorities were defined as follows: 
OPCON: Under OPCON authority, a commander can direct the movement of assigned or 
attached forces and assign missions for a period of time at a given place. The commander 
is responsible for sustaining the unit and may reorganize subordinate forces.  
TACON: Under TACON authority, the commander is limited to executing the assigned 
mission at the assigned time and place with the forces provided.  
TACON Plus: Under TACON Plus (TACON+), the commander may change the 
assigned mission, time and place for assigned or temporarily attached forces, based on 
the situation and his understanding of commander’s intent. 
Research Methodology and Game Design 
 
9 
Cell Structure and Participants 
Global ’14 used a multi-cell configuration for the Blue team. Each cell represented a 
headquarters staff at either the Task Force Commander (Tier 2) level, one of five Component 
Commanders (Tier 3, or an aggregation of Task Unit Commanders at the Tier 4 level. With the 
exception of Tier 4-to-Tier 4 commands, cells did not interact face-to-face; instead they relied on 
a communications and data network which was susceptible to enemy intrusion and interference. 
Blue team membership was drawn from across the DoD enterprise. A USN O-8 led the Blue cell 
which consisted of approximately 60 joint US, British, Canadian, Australian and Japanese 
players.  
The Red team was manned by the War Game Department’s (WGD) Office of Naval Intelligence 
Detachment (ONI-Det). As Global ’14 was a 1 ½ sided game, the Red team worked in concert 
with White/Control team, using a combination of free play, pre-scripted events and dynamic 
injects to ensure game play adequately addressed the various research questions.  
The White cell consisted of primarily WGD personnel as assisted by external participants to 
represent Tier 1 commands as necessary (geographic combatant commander, TRANSCOM, 
CYBERCOM, STRATCOM and National Command Authority). 
See Section III. ?Demographics? and Annex A: ?Player Manning by Cell) for specific cell 
membership information. 
Game Play 
Global ’14 used an action-reaction style of play. Blue and Red submitted their moves in an 
alternating fashion, with each turn cycle taking approximately four hours to complete. A nominal 
four-hour turn cycle consisted of the following: 
0+00  Integrated Task Order (ITO) submitted from Tier 3 to Tier 4.3 
0+00 – 1+00 Adjudication of submitted ITO; forces moved by Tier 4 per ITO. 
1+00 – 2+00 Adjudicated continued; offensive action from ITO resolved with 
defensive actions from opponent. Outcomes reported to Tier 3 by Tier 4. 
2+00  ITO submitted from opposing side. 
2+00 – 3+00 Adjudication of submitted ITO; forces moved by Tier 4 per ITO. 
3+00 – 4+00 Adjudication continued; offensive action from ITO resolved with 
defensive actions from opponent. Outcomes reported to Tier 3 by Tier 4. 
4+00  Cycle repeats. 
Play did not stop during adjudication. While Tier 4 were carrying out orders and combat outcomes 
were being determined, Tier 2 and 3 continued to assess previous moves, update target lists, adjust 
apportionment, allocate and coordinate forces and draft tasking orders for the next turn. 
                                                
3 The Integrated Task Order (ITO) was a game product used to communicate a Tier 3 commander’s orders to their 
Tier 4 CJTU and TU commanders. 
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In order to bring players unfamiliar with the game mechanics ‘up to speed’ (also known as 
‘leveling up’), initial moves were pre-built to allow players to first learn how to use the game 
tool to submit moves (without having to build the move, in this case Blue Turn 0), then modify 
and submit an existing move (Blue Turn 1), and finally create and submit their own move (Blue 
Turn 2 and beyond). Over the course of the week, this resulted in six complete turns. 
Blue players were able to recommend changes to authorities or processes to the Blue Cell Lead 
at any time for possible adjustment of the C2 system in order to improve unity of effort, 
simplicity, flexibility, resiliency, operational integration, or cross domain synergy. 
After each turn, individual cell leads completed an End of Turn survey; after the last turn of each 
day, all participants completed an End of Day survey. An End of Day Plenary was moderated by 
WGD personnel and provided a forum for Blue players to discuss topics of interest surfaced 
through game play, such as authorities, processes, roles and responsibilities, and force 
distribution. 
The Final Plenary provided the TF Cell and each Tier 3 and Tier 4 game cell the opportunity to 
out-brief their observations regarding the four attributes and their effect on current C2 structures 
and processes, as well as evaluate and discuss the overall effectiveness of the four attributes with 
regard to the C2 criteria, assisted by analytic hierarchy process (AHP) software, a pair-wise 
comparison decision aid. 
Game Tool 
The Global ’14 Game Tool consisted of two parts which essentially acted like a web-based email 
system with attachments. Move forms were completed and sent to other game cells via a network 
email system. Which forms a command could create and to whom they could send them was a 
function of the command’s roles, responsibilities and authorities.  
The primary means of coordination between command cells was chat. There were various chat 
rooms available, depending on player role and command assignment. Both email delivery and 
chat was impacted by network loading and communications degradation. Control was able to 
modify network speeds as a function of bandwidth, file size, offensive and defensives cyber 
network actions, jamming and satellite status. This had a direct impact on the players’ ability to 
pass the information required to support game play.  
A total of 14 different types of orders and forms were used over the course of play to nominate 
and prioritize targets, apportion effort, request support, allocate force, task subordinate units, 
coordinate fires, and report combat results. Additionally there were forms to request and 
promulgate changes to the C2 system in terms of delegated authorities, senior-subordinate 
relationships, attached forces, etc.4 
                                                
4 A listing and explanation of each of the game forms is provided as Annex B. 
Research Methodology and Game Design 
11 
Adjudication 
Turns alternated between Blue and Red, with one team with the initiative/attack and the other 
reacting/counter-attack. The roles then reversed. Units possessed varying amounts of combat 
power across seven warfare areas: 
? Cyber Operations 
? Counter-Space Operations 
? Anti-Air Warfare 
? Ballistic Missile Defense 
? Naval Surface Warfare 
? Undersea Warfare 
? Strike Warfare (Included all combat against ground based targets) 
Combat was primarily limited to units occupying the same map-square; certain long range 
weapons could be employed beyond the square occupied by the shooter, though required over-
the-horizon targeting support. Simplified C2 networks and “kill chains” were developed, 
particularly for Red A2/AD weapons, allowing Blue to exercise disrupt-destroy-defeat options. 
Outcomes were ultimately determined by WGD umpires using a probability based aggregated 
fires model based on a set of pre-determined rules, and directly observed by the Tier 4 players.  
Along with traditional kinetic warfare, both sides were able to conduct cyber operations - 
exploitation, offensive and defensive - as well as space operations involving targeting and 
communication satellites which were susceptible to various counter-space attacks. 
Sustainment play tracked fuel, ammunition and supply status of each unit via a forces database 
and map displays. Supplies were stored in depots in numerous locations and moved via air and 
seaborne lift as well as ground transport. Engineering units were able to establish expeditionary 
airfields and forward arming and refueling points and repair damaged airfields and ports. 
LIMITATIONS OF GAME DESIGN AND ANALYSIS 
A major challenge for the War Gaming Department concerns development of a game that 
provides the robust insights into an issue or problem sought by the game’s sponsor. Accordingly, 
managing stakeholder expectations about what the final game report will tell them with respect 
to broad-based implications is essential. Stakeholders often seek findings that will provide them 
with predictive conclusions for decision-making purposes. Gaming is predominately a 
descriptive process, not an experiment. Even if a game is repeated, it lacks sufficient controls to 
ensure validity. Sponsors should not attempt to draw inferences beyond what the specific players 
did in Global ’14 in terms of generalizability (the ability to apply the findings observed for a 
small population to the broader world around us).  
Global ’14 play did not execute exactly as designed. During the game’s development phase, the 
adjudication rules supporting Tier 4 play grew in complexity, and the game became very Tier 4 
focused despite the higher interest in Tier 2 and 3 decisions. Consequently, many of the short-
comings in execution tend to be related to Tier 4 and the CJTU attribute. 
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Design Limitations   
CJTUs were not purpose built by the players at game start. To support the commencement of 
game play, the Control team provided the initial CJTU assignments and composition, ensuring 
that all of the Tier 3 component commands had at least 1 CJTU under their command. 
Unfortunately, this appeared to frustrate the players, since they didn’t understand the rationale 
behind why particular CJTUs had been formed. That said, they tended to use them without 
significant modification from what was initially provided by the Control team, even though they 
had the capability to alter the composition of their assigned CJTUs and TUs.  
Having all of the Tier 4 players together in one room provided them with perfect theater-wide 
situational awareness. This was a result of the one common game map, which was originally 
developed to accelerate adjudication and feedback for the Tier 3 players. As a result, Tier 3 was 
quick to delegate authority to Tier 4, due to their superior situational awareness (in terms of force 
disposition) and ability to coordinate face-to-face with their Tier 4 colleagues. Having each Tier 
4 in a separate cell with only awareness of their local area was considered during design, but was 
rejected as it would likely have significantly slowed the tactical play and adjudication.  
There were not enough Tier 4 players to effectively move all the OOB pieces. A single Tier 4 
player could have control of traditional task units, as well as CJTUs with varying levels of 
delegated control (OPCON, TACON or TACON+). Despite color coding to distinguish differing 
levels of command authorities, it was difficult to enforce use limitations based on authority. 
Hence all Tier 4 players essentially exercised TACON+ over their forces, whether or not that 
was the actual delegated authority, making analytic evaluation of differences in authority 
difficult.  
As time grew tight and communications degraded, move forms became increasingly 
incomplete. While less specific ‘mission type orders’ were anticipated under these 
circumstances, players began taking shortcuts and omitting data from reports, particularly at the 
Tier 4 level (reference Tier 4 manning comment above). As a result, data streams connected to 
the relationships between XDOCE, ICC, SCC and CJTU decisions were significantly 
diminished. 
Analysis Limitations 
It should be noted that both the quantitative and qualitative datasets analyzed in this game report 
lack generalizability due to the small sample sizes of participants—none of whom were 
randomly selected from a population known to be normally distributed. However, through 
triangulation and meta-analysis, researchers enhanced the reliability and validity of findings that 
should prove valuable to inform both the sponsor and players about XDO C2.  
This game was designed to be highly inductive in order to garner broad-based insights relative to 
the research questions. Inductive games leverage qualitative data to identify themes based on 
player decisions during game play. The qualitative nature of data can result in subjective 
findings. To control for the subjectivity and complexity of the research area, a number of design 
and analysis measures were employed. The participants in this game represented an accessible 
and purposeful sample to provide information-rich data. In this report, the findings are limited to 
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the analysis of Global ’14 game data, supplemented by the collective wisdom of the Global 
Project Team, based on their 3 years examining the ASB concept.  
Two threats to internal validity concern the quality of the data collected and the accuracy of the 
analytical techniques used to review these data. To ensure quality data collection, the post-game 
analysis team relied on player-created products, such as game tool products, individual survey 
responses, and final cell out-briefs. Insights extracted from these data sources were subsequently 
cross-checked, or triangulated, with other data sets including ethnographer notes to ensure 
accuracy and conclusiveness. The accuracy of the analytical techniques was enhanced by using 
multiple methods, tools, and researchers to review the same data. Methods included content 
analysis, grounded theory, and descriptive statistics. Multiple research teams reviewed the same 
data sets using different approaches. Themes and insights derived from multiple researchers and 
approaches reflect more validity than a single researcher using a single approach.  
To explore the degree of external validity, one must consider whether the data collected can be 
generalized across the population of subjects. The demographics of the participants provide some 
measure to assess this attribute. The game was designed to stimulate critical thinking and 
analysis and sought players from different warfare areas, services and nations. Although the 
game had a diverse group of participants, it proves to be cost-prohibitive and too complex to 
have every perspective represented from all stakeholders across the joint community. Therefore, 
some gaps in perspectives can be assumed for any game, including Global ’14. 
14 
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III. Demographics 
U.S. and international participants were sought based on their warfare experience and service 
affiliation. The subsequent demographic statistics were compiled from self-reported responses 
garnered from the online registration site and the individual player questionnaire administered at 
the beginning of the game. The 75 players who contributed demographic data consisted primarily 
of mid to senior-level military and civilian officials from the United States (56 players), 
Australia (6 players), United Kingdom (6 players), Japan (4 players), and Canada (3 players). 
International players were primarily distributed throughout the Tier 3 cells to ensure coalition 
perspectives were represented during cell deliberations. Each branch of service and functional 
area of expertise was adequately represented during the game; Navy (34), Air Force (21), Army 
(13), and Marine Corps (7). 37 players held the rank of O-5/GS-14, 17 held the rank of O-6/GS-
15, 16 held the rank of O-4/GS-13, 3 held the rank of O-3/GS-12, 1 held the rank of O-7, and 1 
player held the rank of O-8. Figures 2 and 3 depict the number of participants by branch of 
service and warfare specialty across player game cells.  
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Figure ?: Warfare Specialty by Player Cell 
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IV. Findings and Recommendations 
This section of the report addresses implications to the draft Joint XDO C2 CONOPS related to 
each of the four C2 attributes, and provides corresponding findings and recommendations. Player 
derived themes and phrases from game data (e.g., Web IQ Threaded Discussion, Final Cell 
Presentations, chat, products and forms, and ethnographic notes) were coded and analyzed to 
identify concepts relevant to informing the game’s objectives. The analytic team used grounded 
theory and content analysis to identify patterns across data streams in order make general 
statements related to strengths and weaknesses, organizational composition, roles and 
responsibilities, authorities and processes, and mission essential tasks for each of the four C2 
attributes. In this way, emergent themes were grounded both empirically (in the data) and 
conceptually to the wider analytic context of the CONOPS.  
COMBINED JOINT FORCE INFORMATION COMPONENT COMMANDER (CJFICC) 
Strengths And Weaknesses 
“The main benefit for the CJFICC is putting many of those things that exist 
behind ‘black doors’ under a person that has the clearances and understanding to 
pull them together.”  
– Global ’14 Player comment 
Enhancing Unity of Effort and Operational Integration  
Finding 1.1: Players at the Tier 2 and 3 levels generally viewed the CJFICC concept as 
enhancing unity of effort and operational integration by integrating and synchronizing 
cybernetic, electronic warfare, space and information operations (though information operations 
outside of cyber and EW were not examined as a limitation of game design).  
Discussion: As the complexity and ability of cyber, space, EW and information operations to 
significantly impact the battle grows, the players indicated that there needs to be a specific 
commander who is responsible to provide that type of support to the traditional component 
commanders, and that the CJFICC is one potential way to address that need. Players stated that 
the operational-level view of peer component commander operations enabled the CJFICC to 
arrange and sequence support in alignment with CJTF objectives, and the broader view of the 
Information Environment “enabled integrated support to multiple domains towards common 
objectives.” 
“The CJFICC definitely enhances synchronization of limited cyber assets to 
support the warfighter ...timing and massing of forces against a very competent 
adversary. Clearly brings to bear cyber assets both within and outside the JOA” 
 – Global ’14 Player comment 
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By design, the CJFICC concept integrates cyber, space and EW effects. Many players saw the 
synchronization value between CJFICC and other components to coordinate actions to optimize 
cyber, space and EW effects and improve utilization of low density/high demand capabilities.5  
However, some players debated the degree to which the CJFICC contributed to operational 
integration, countering that the CJFICC added an additional unnecessary layer of complexity, 
since US Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) already provides support to the joint force. 
Furthermore, if CYBERCOM was to create a component commander, it could potentially 
resemble an upside-down pyramid, consisting of a large staff in charge of a relatively few 
number of actual forces. Some participants also stated that effects integration was ineffective 
during the game, with one player stating that “effects continued to be misaligned [between the 
components] throughout game play” and that this could have been alleviated if the CJFICC 
functions were devolved back to the other components. 
Players concluded that national constraints and restraints for integrating multinational cyber 
forces into the CJFICC warrant further investigation. They highlighted the need to better 
understand the implications associated with providing TACON plus to allied forces operating 
in CJTU constructs. To address these issues, players concluded that integrating allies early in 
the planning process to plan offensive and defensive cyber operations is critically important 
to executing cross-domain operations. Moreover, players concluded that the CJFICC should 
expand bi-lateral and multilateral information sharing related to cyber plans, capabilities, 
and effects with allies and partners prior to conflict, as well as build the relationships and 
processes to protect partner communication networks. 
Recommendation 1.1: Not applicable (No CONOPS modifications are required). 
Cross-Domain Synergy through Shared Expertise and Understanding   
Finding 1.2: Similar to the argument for operational integration, the CJFICC was seen as 
inherently cross-domain due to its domains of responsibility (cyber-domain, space domain), but 
confusion exists to what exactly is meant by ‘cross-domain operations.’ 
Discussion: Though players generally thought that the CJFICC contributed significantly to 
cross- domain operations, they appeared to struggle to grasp what was and was not ‘cross-
domain,’ even though definitions and examples as it pertained to the game were provided. Some 
favorable cross- domain comments were actually more applicable to joint - vice cross-domain - 
operations. Other players equated intel gain-loss deconfliction or synchronization as equivalent 
to cross-domain operations. Still others offered that an “information domain” was more 
appropriate than a cyber domain. One player provided an interesting take on the difficulty of 
cross-domain operations and why it may currently be the case, stating “...the game cannot drive 
us to cross-domain solutions because perhaps we do not have the toolsets yet to genuinely think 
that way.” 
                                                
5 As mentioned earlier, not all aspects of Information Operations were exercised and therefore not integrated; for 
example, there was no deception plan, since the open information nature of game play made such activities 
irrelevant. 
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To fully leverage a cross-domain approach amongst the component commanders, better insight 
into CJFICC capabilities is required. Players, mostly at the Tier 4 level, suggested that they did 
not have visibility into either CJFICC capabilities or effects, and that coordination via the 
XDOCE was weak. Players concluded that the CJFICC must balance between the offensive 
and defensive requirements between component commanders to gain the requisite 
operational effects across the joint force. Players viewed cyber as a key enabler to 
generating effects in other domains and emphasized the need to better understand the 
CJFICC’s campaign plan and how the effects of each component commander are integrated 
and synchronized across multiple missions and lines of operation. To effectively employ 
joint and combined cyber capabilities in cross-domain operations, players concluded that 
joint planning staffs at the operational and tactical levels need to better understand how 
operations in a given domain influences cyber operations, how cyber capabilities can 
achieve kinetic and non-kinetic effects in other domains, and secondary and tertiary effects 
that impact future operations. In any case, the XDOCE role was deemed as critical to enabling 
CJFICC contribution to cross domain operations, both from a having CJFICC community 
expertise embedded in other component commands, as well as traditional warfare expertise 
embedded in the CJFICC. 
Recommendation 1.2: The CONOP should include an illustrative example of cross-domain 
operations in order to help readers gain a better appreciation for what is meant by cross-domain 
operations. 
Authorities And Processes 
Delegating Authorities under the CJFICC Construct 
Finding 1.3: USSTRATCOM may be more inclined to delegate space and cyber authorities to a 
CJFICC as the single commander with a similar mission set. 
Discussion: Some players saw an increased likelihood that authorities would be delegated under 
a CJFICC construct, as space and cyber authorities are already under USSTRATCOM, which 
would be more inclined to delegate to a single commander with a similar mission set.  
Insomuch as the players saw value in the CJFICC, many had severe reservations about the 
CJFICC’s actual ability to exercise command or be given authorities over many of the strategic 
assets it wielded in the game. The following player comment best summarizes this assertion.  
There is potential to develop this concept. However, in order to make it a reality, 
the [Department of Defense] and interagency will have to come to a consensus on 
authorities and responsibilities. Today, cyber and space fall under 
USSTRATCOM per the Unified Command Plan. There is still debate about 
making USCYBERCOM a functional combatant command ... There is merit to 
having a non-air component within the JTF focused on providing AOR-specific 
effects... but theatre space and cyber effects must be weighed against global 
impacts. This consideration requires close coordination with national agencies 
and HHQ [higher headquarters] along with significant delegation of authorities 
to the JTF level which are today held by [the president] and [secretary of 
defense].  
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Several players identified the potential for undesired impacts outside the JOA as making the 
delegation of authorities difficult at best without some proven means of control. As one player 
noted: “The challenge of authorities is central. Because of the potential strategic [second and 
third] order effects getting authorities will be difficult even at the CJTF level.” Other players 
countered that while authority delegation will always be a challenge, “We can’t just accept that 
permissions and authorities are hard to get at the operational level. We need to change that now.” 
Additional players noted that “... not all authorities will be delegated in our lifetimes. But cyber, 
EW, and information ops authorities already exist at component levels. The CJFICC idea is to 
put them under a single commander in theater ...to which both signals and cyber authorities can 
be delegated ...nothing about limitations on authorities undermines this idea.” 
The CJFICC will need these permissions prior to conflict, as getting the authorities during a 
conflict will be time consuming. The following player comment highlights this finding:  
“Time to bring the comprehensive, centrally managed capabilities that CJFICC 
represent [in order to] gain more timely/rightly focused authorities from Tier 0 
and manage the authorities from a JFC perspective and apply CJFICC resources 
efficiently horizontally and vertically throughout the JFC’s organization.” 
The CONOP currently states that “Unless cyberspace effects are pre-planned and pre-approved, 
authorization may be too cumbersome to be realistically available for tactical employment. 
Coordinating through operational and strategic level commands adds communication layers and 
time. A communication contested environment will make already cumbersome coordination 
highly impracticable for dynamic warfighting situations.” 
The CONOP further states that “The CJFICC is given the authority necessary to accomplish the 
missions and tasks assigned by the JFC,” which seemingly over-simplifies a significant 
challenge to the practicality of the CJFICC concept, even though the CONOP goes to great 
length to delineate many of the authorities which currently govern cyber, space and EW 
operations.  
Recommendation 1.3: The CONOP should clearly define the authorities needed by the CJFICC 
to operate as envisioned, as well as appropriate control measures to minimize the effects of 
undesired impacts outside the JOA (the specifics of this recommendation are beyond the 
classification and scope of this report). USCYBERCOM’s “Emerging Joint Concept for 
Cyberspace” may provide additional insights for CONOP inclusion. 
Controlling Information and Electronic Warfare Assets 
Finding 1.4: Whether OPCON, TACON or ‘TACON-plus, players identified the need to better 
define how cyber, information and electronic warfare assets will be controlled, by whom and 
under what command authority.  
Discussion: Players questioned the right level of authority delegation across the tiers, from 
USSTRATCOM (Tier O) down to the task units (Tier IV). Who decides? In general, players 
tended to favor as much delegation as possible as low as possible. While some players asserted 
that the CJFICC functions should reside at Tier II, others countered that it is critical to have 
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CJFICC integration at the Tier III level in order to operationalize these capabilities, realizing that 
this will require work to resolve authority and process issues that currently exist. 
By having the CJFICC as a Tier III commander, CJFICC members saw themselves as an “equal 
player” to the other component commanders, and were able to influence courses of action during 
planning, vice attempting to bring supporting capabilities to bear after the fact. Additionally this 
brought the CJTF commander non-kinetic effects that he otherwise would not have had under his 
control, alleviating the requirement to send requests up the chain of command which would have 
further complicated synchronization. 
During game play, Tier 3 entities tended to delegate ‘TACON-plus’ authority to their 
subordinate Tier IV commands. Several players likened ‘TACON-plus’ as being the “easy 
button.” One player postulated “that is an indication that such level of authority is the right way 
ahead. Pushing down authority (aligns) with mission command and with ops in an A2/AD 
environment against a competitor with comms degrading capability. Recommend continuing 
exploration of ‘TACON-plus’...may be absolutely necessary in future ops.”  
Recommendation 1.4: Continue to develop the CONOP with the CJFICC as a Tier III level 
command. The authorities and command relationships between the Tier III CJFICC and its Tier 
II superior and Tier IV subordinates warrants further investigation. Currently the CONOP 
discusses OPCON and TACON relationships for forces under the CJFICC. Continue 
investigation of ‘TACON-plus’ or similar modification of existing command authorities as an 
effective means of exercising command over attached units complimentary to mission command, 
to include the requirement for command relationships to be specified using establishing 
directives in order to clearly articulate which OPCON-related command authorities should be 
delegated to the Tier 4 level to enable mission success. 
Cyber Authorities and CJTF 
Finding 1.5: The CJTF commander would benefit from having some level of cyber operations 
directly under his control and the CJFICC could “provide the bridge from national/strategic-level 
assets to the operational level.” However, additional roles and responsibilities of the CJFICC are 
not well understood. 
Discussion: Which roles and responsibilities should be retained at higher levels such as 
USSTRATCOM vice which should be assumed by in-theater commanders, and which should be 
combined under a single commander formed the core of the player discussions.6  
Some players stated that too many missions were assigned to the CJFICC, and that cyber 
operations alone would consume a component commander’s staff. Others argued for an 
incremental approach to CJFICC development, e.g. start with cyber operations and then expand 
to other information environment related missions. Which missions should be added, however, 
was not clear. Some advocated that cyber and information operations were logical fits, others 
that cyber and EW were better combined under the CJFICC. 
                                                
6 Note that the game was not designed to ‘test’ the ability of the players assigned to the CJFICC to perform all the 
potential tasks associated with cyber, space, EW and information operations as a measure of the utility of the 
concept or appropriateness of the assigned missions. 
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Even within information operations, some tasks may be better served under the CJFICC than 
others, but for each player in favor of a role for the CJFICC, there was another opposed. For 
example, while one player suggested that operational deception would be an appropriate mission 
for the CJFICC (currently included in the CONOP), another countered that CJFICC should NOT 
be the JTF planner for deception, stating that “planning, managing, and executing a deception 
plan for the JTF will consume all of the energy for the CJFICC and the important needs of 
synchronizing cyber and EW into the fight will be left out.” 
Fundamentally the players identified the need to “determine which parts of the information 
environment are best served by a component commander ...what elements are essential to 
Information Dominance in support of warfighter objectives.” The diversity of the functions, 
authorities, and capabilities proposed for the CJFICC suggested to some players the need to 
coordinate those efforts under a central entity for synergy and unity of effort. For others, that 
diversity argued for NOT consolidating the missions under a single commander: 
“Space, cyber and strategic/operational EW are currently very different functions 
with sets of problems in authorities and capabilities that require a wide range of 
expertise. Putting them together outside of an operational commander such as 
CJTF only adds additional demands on already strained formations without the 
proven benefit of any real results.”  
– Global ’14 Player comment 
While the Problem Definition portion of the CONOP states that “effects from both space and 
cyberspace domains can provide value and create cross-domain synergy for tactical forces,” the 
Solution section does not make a specific case for why the two domains of cyberspace and space 
should be grouped together under one commander, stating simply that “The CJFICC is 
envisioned to be responsible for the integration and employment of assigned, attached, and/or 
forces available for tasking in the space and cyber domains…,” nor does it justify why 
Information Operations (IO) are also to be included. The “interrelationship” argument made 
between cyber and space (space assets give cyber systems global reach, cyber systems control 
space assets), and similarly between cyber operations and EW are (1) not included in the 
Problem/Solution section (but instead in the later Space and Cyber Domain section), and (2) are 
not sufficiently compelling. 
Recommendation 1.5: Focus the CJFICC roles and responsibilities specifically to cyber 
operations, while continuing to evaluate the utility of shifting SCA and IO responsibilities to a 
dedicated component commander. If the decision is made to retain IO and/or SCA 
responsibilities under the CJFICC, then revise the CONOPS (particularly the Problem and 
Solution sections) to include a compelling rationale that considers both the challenges (and 
opportunities) that such a C2 arrangement would create.  
Organizational Composition 
CJFICC vs. Current C2 System 
Finding 1.6: While there was general agreement that the functions of the CJFICC as presented in 
the game need to be integrated, there were conflicting arguments as to whether a single 
command was the best way to accomplish this integration.  
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Discussion: Those supporting the CJFICC organizational construct cited advantages in terms of 
parity in planning vis-a-vis other component commanders, provided a bridge to connect national 
assets to operational effects, and the ability to synchronize otherwise disparate information 
effects. Others postulated that the same level of integrated effects could be achieved using 
existing C2 structures, and a new separate CJFICC staff was neither required nor desired. 
The primary argument in support of the CJFICC component level organization is that without a 
central “information domain champion with a seat at the table” able to coordinate efforts from 
Tier 0 down to Tier 4, it simply does not happen. Cyber, Space, EW and information operations 
now run through such a wide variety of organizations with differing authorities, classification 
levels, approval processes, and employment timelines that synchronized operations within the 
information environment, let alone in concert with traditional kinetic operations, is highly 
unlikely. The CJFICC can best provide the operational-level integration of these capabilities in 
support of CJTF objectives. The following player comments highlight the perceived utility of the 
CJFICC attribute: 
“The main benefit for the CJFICC is putting many of those things that exist 
behind “black doors” under a person that has the clearances and understanding 
to pull them together.” 
“Putting the CJFICC at Tier 3 level brings the discussion into mainstream 
operations discussions and avoids it becoming a collateral duty for another. It 
also avoids IW capabilities being considered after-the-fact.” 
In order to integrate effects throughout the task force, the CJFICC “must have all associated 
subject matter experts/XDOCEs and staffing in order to be effective.” Rather than a new 
command, some players countered that the functions of the proposed CJFICC could be carried 
out just as well, if not better, under existing command structures (J2, J3/J5, and J6) supported by 
robust LNOs. The following player comment supports this viewpoint: 
“Strongly believe the CJFICC needs to be a subordinate part of J3/J5 to 
accomplish the integration that ensures CJFICC capabilities are used effectively. 
I do not see the need for a separate CJFICC; rather, the CJFICC should be rolled 
into J3/J5 Ops/ Plans.” 
Recommendation 1.6: Continue to examine and refine the CJFICC concept, focusing on its role 
as the functional component commander for cyber operations, to include an examination of the 
JFHQ-Cyber construct for possible organizational insights for a cyber-related Tier 2 and Tier 3 
command structure. 
The Role of the XDOCE and CJFICC 
Finding 1.7: Specific to the CJFICC, the XDOCE could be an effective pathway to get 
information out from ‘behind the green door” and demystify the ‘magic’ associated with cyber 
operations. 
Discussion: In terms of the other three C2 attributes - CJTU, SCC and XDOCE – the XDOCE 
was the one most discussed in connection with the CJFICC, though comments tended to conflate 
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XDOCEs with more traditional LNOs. 7 The degree to which the CJFICC was able to integrate 
effects across the task force via their XDOCE was hampered in no small part by the way the 
players attempted to employ the new concepts. The player comment below indicates that they 
wanted to look at the problem differently, but lacked the knowledge and situational awareness to 
do so: 
“We haven’t done good integration because we’re playing the OLD way. We’re 
NOT looking at RISK and using a different force than our own to perform a 
mission with less risk. We’re trying to hit every nail with our OWN hammer. If I 
had that visibility, I would have USED a different cross domain asset, but I didn’t 
have that understanding or SA. Without an understanding of [the] cyber 
component, [I can’t] say ‘do I think there is a cyber-capability that will enable me 
to do my job with less risk.’ “ 
The CONOP currently discusses the role of the XDOCE vis-à-vis the CJFICC. It suggests that 
“The CJFICC should establish XDOCEs with other commander’s headquarters to better integrate 
information operations with the JFC’s overall CONOPS. The XDOCEs will help facilitate 
information operations to the lowest tactical level in accordance with the JFC’s joint information 
operations plan.” 
Recommendation 1.7: Not applicable (No CONOPS modifications are required). 
The Role of the CJFICC and Sustainment  
Finding 1.8: The “CJFICC could be a great asset for logistics.”  
Discussion: With logistics and sustainment so communications-intensive, and since the 
associated networks are susceptible to degradation and/or intrusion, a CJFICC could add value 
by centrally managing theater network defensive operations in order to improve network 
reliability and security. 
Recommendation 1.8: Not applicable (No CONOPS modifications are required). 
The role of the CJFICC and Intelligence 
Finding 1.9: Players took both sides of the argument regarding the nature of the relationship 
between the CJFICC and Intelligence. The argument over Intel and its relationship to the 
CJFICC is in no small part due to the conflicting definitions and usage of terms like ‘information 
warfare,’ ‘information environment,’ ‘information domain,’ ‘information operations,’ and 
‘information dominance’ and the role intelligence plays in each.  
Discussion: Some players stressed that “Intel is definitely part of the CJFICC. Unity of effort 
principles would point out that Intelligence must be with the Information Component 
Commander,” while others countered with “CJFICC is not JIOC,” and “Intel needs to support 
CJFICC but [isn’t] ...‘part’ of the CJFICC. There needs to be a theater/component/JTF/CC 
intelligence presence providing broad [situational awareness] and specific support (CJFICC is 
                                                
7 This highlights the difficulty in playing multiple new concepts with inexperienced players in the same game 
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one of those elements) but subordinating Intel to the CJFICC would negatively impact all the 
other components, et al.” 
Recommendation 1.9: Early discussions of CJFICC missions included an intelligence role, but 
later workshops concluded that the CJFICC was a consumer of intelligence like any other 
component commander. While no specific change to the CONOP with regard to Intelligence is 
recommended, the previous recommendation to reduce reliance on terms like information 
operations and information warfare is germane.  
CROSS-DOMAIN OPERATIONS COORDINATION ELEMENT (XDOCE) 
Strengths And Weaknesses 
“XDOCE needs work, but it has promise. Some will want to hand-wave it away, 
but with a real understanding of the threat environment…it has potential to allow 
better joint force employment against a near-peer in a comms denied 
environment.” 
 – Global ’14 Player  
Enhancing Cross-Domain Synergy  
Finding 2.1: The XDOCE could serve as a “forcing function” to improve cross-domain 
operations in an A2/AD environment.  
Discussion: The access challenges created by an adversary employing A2/AD capabilities 
may require the use of cross-domain capabilities to gain operational access. Players 
concluded that the XDOCE could serve as a “forcing function” to enhance the integration 
and application of capabilities from different services within a domain to gain or main 
access in another domain. Players emphasized that the XDOCE should contribute to the 
planning, directing, monitoring, and assessment of cross-domain operations on 
command staffs at the JTF, Component Commander, and task unit level. As one 
player noted: “As an XDOCE member, I learned we had responsibilities to quickly coordinate 
XD [cross-domain] operations in order to feed the planning process for my assigned domain.” 
The contribution of the XDOCE at the Tier 3 level is highlighted by the following 
player comment:  
“I think we’re not looking at XDOCE from the right angle. We shouldn’t value its 
role based on the ability to shift capabilities from one domain to another but 
rather the value of assessing who is better postured with forces and authorities to 
optimize the right effect which results in conditions being sought by the 
Commander. The benefit this brings to the Commander is from a holistic 
approach to finding the right combination of forces to achieve desired effects. No 
one does this at a Tier 3 level and [it] will certainly improve flexibility across 
domains.” 
However, some players suggested that the XDOCE construct might violate the C2 principle 
of simplicity used in the Global game by creating additional processes, procedures, 
personnel and authorities at the Tier 3 level.  
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Recommendation 2.1: Continue to examine and refine the XDOCE Concept, to include 
how the XDOCE will integrate with current organizational staffs and C2 functions.  
Authorities And Processes 
Delegating Command Authority to XDOCEs 
Finding 2.2: XDOCEs may require command authority to execute cross-domain operations.  
Discussion: Players emphasized that CJTU staffs must possess the requisite cross-domain 
expertise to effectively employ all forces assigned to the CJTU Commander. They concluded 
that maintaining this expertise on staff will increase the likelihood of delegating operational 
control of forces to peer and subordinate commanders because they have a greater level of trust 
and confidence that their forces will be employed properly. While control of such forces may 
be retained by a functional component commander (FCC) or delegated to a subordinate 
CJTU, the command authority can also be retained by the assigned commander or 
delegated to an appropriate XDOCE member with the requisite domain knowledge and 
expertise to effectively plan and direct forces. For example, if an Aegis cruiser is assigned to 
a CJTU under the ACC, then a maritime domain expert, well-versed in the operational 
employment of such a platform, must be available on the CJTU staff to either advise the 
CJTU Commander or to assume control if delegated.  
In Global ’14, the XDOCE authorities were limited to coordination with XDOCE’s at either 
the JTF (Tier 2) or FCC (Tier 3) levels, as no XDOCE’s existed at the CTU/CJTU (Tier 4) 
level. As expected, this coordination often consisted of arranging cross-domain support, either 
as the requester or provider of a desired effect. However, much of the XDOCE coordination 
consisted of communicating logistical requirements between the SCC and the other Tier 3  
FCC’s, which is not envisioned as a responsibility of the XDOCE.  
During Global ’14, the control of all such forces was delegated by the FCC to their 
subordinate CJTU’s, which were then responsible for the employment of those assets. 
Unfortunately, since the CJTU’s were 1 or 2-person cells with no XDOCE, they generally 
lacked the relevant domain expertise and requisite staff capacity to effectively employ assets 
from other domains. While the CONOPS currently addresses the need for domain-specific 
expertise as part of both an XDOCE and CJTU staff, it does not address the potential for an 
XDOCE member being delegated command authority by either an FCC or CJTU 
commander.  
Recommendation 2.2: Revise the XDOCE portion of the CONOPS to incorporate the 
potential for an XDOCE member to be delegated command authority by their assigned 
commander. 
XDOCE Process and Integration with Current C2 Processes 
Finding 2.3: The relationship between XDOCE processes and current processes used to 
plan, direct, monitor, and assess operations at the Tier 2, 3, and 4 level is not well defined 
and understood.  
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Discussion: Lack of specific XDOCE processes in the CONOPS makes it difficult to 
ascertain how the XDOCE will integrate with existing operational planning and execution 
processes. While no XDOCE processes are specified in the CONOPS, Global ’14 created some 
notional products and processes in an attempt to begin to identify the relevant processes 
that the XDOCE may be involved in. Accordingly, the XDOCE participants in the game were 
responsible for producing the Component Commander Need Requests and Fill Orders. The 
Need Requests were intended to capture the component’s capability or effects shortfalls or 
gaps, such as the need for logistics, transportation, or a desired effect (e.g., neutralize mine 
storage facility) due to a lack of organic capacity or capability. The Fill Orders provided the 
means for a component commander to satisfy another FCC’s Need Request. The JTF 
XDOCE representative monitored the need-fill process and intervened as necessary to ensure 
that critical needs were either filled by component commanders or forwarded outside the 
task force for resourcing. While these products and processes were effective in giving the 
XDOCE players a viable role in the game, they tended to stovepipe the XDOCE participants 
from the other cell players, since these products could only be created and edited by the 
XDOCE, while the Integrated Task Order (ITO) that it supported could only be developed 
and modified by the non-XDOCE participants in the FCC cells.  
Several players suggested institutionalizing the XDOCE as a board, cell or working group, with a 
clearly defined battle rhythm and responsibilities. For example, within the ACC and associated 
JFACC AOC, should the XDOCE participate in the apportionment and allocation processes? At 
the MCC and associated JFMCC MOC, how will the XDOCE support concurrent efforts within 
plans, future ops and current ops? As one player noted: “… [we] must find a way to integrate the 
XDOCE planning into the notional planning cycle in order to truly be effective.” 
Recommendation 2.3: The CONOPS should identify specific operational planning and 
execution-related processes that the XDOCE will participate in, what that participation will 
consist of, and how these processes interrelate with current PDMA processes at the tier 2, 3, 
and 4 levels. While many different approaches could be taken to incorporating the XDOCE 
in to the Boards, Bureaus, Centers, Cells and Working Groups (B2C2WG) process, pick one 
- such as a dedicated XDOCE cell - define the associated relationships and modify as 
necessary, based on feedback from games and exercises.  
Roles And Responsibilities 
XDOCE vs. LNOs 
Finding 2.4: The difference between XDOCE planners and LNOs is not well defined and 
understood. 
Discussion: Many players suggested that an XDOCE was simply a collection of super 
LNO’s. Such comments, however, miss the point that the XDOCE is first and foremost a 
domain expert who can advise the commander, rather than a service rep that is present in 
many cases simply to protect their parent command’s equities and serve as an additional 
conduit for information. The following player observation indicates a much more nuanced 
understanding of the role of the XDOCE and how it differs from simply an LNO: 
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“The tendency to employ XDOCEs as a coordinating element to move 
‘capabilities’ across domains does not add value to how the Joint process works 
already. In other words, the XDOCE is not a LNO. The LNO works well under the 
Tier 4 level where you are looking at task-based actions to achieve effects. The 
XDOCE should be applied at the Tier 2 and 3 levels to look at cross-domain 
coordination to realize mission effects to achieve conditions.” 
The following observation also highlights the role of the XDOCE, as well as whom they 
should work for and their authority: 
“[The] XDOCE is meant to be integrated planners/operators who can coordinate 
integrated multiple domain solutions. They don’t belong to another functional 
(service) commander, but to the domain component command where they are 
assigned. They should be empowered equally with members of the assigned CC.” 
Recommendation 2.4: The CONOPS should be revised to specify how the roles and 
responsibilities of the XDOCE and an LNO are different in order to reduce confusion and aid in 
acceptance of the XDOCE construct. This explanation should highlight the fact that an XDOCE 
rep brings domain expertise to the staff, along with an allegiance to the assigned commander and 
the ability to exercise delegated authority that a service or function-based LNO does not. 
The Role of Sustainment and XDOCE Planning and Execution 
Finding 2.5: The CJFSCC XDOCE is fundamentally different from the other component 
commander XDOCE’s because it supports a commander responsible for an operational 
function – sustainment – rather than a functional domain.  
Discussion: The CJFSCC XDOCE’s roles and responsibilities may be different from those of the 
other component commanders, since the CJFSCC is not responsible either for a domain or for 
achieving kinetic or non-kinetic effects. While the XDOCE played a similar domain 
coordination role in the domain-based functional component cells (CJFACC, CJFICC, CJFLCC 
and CJFMCC), the CJFSCC XDOCE was used more as a sustainment coordination cell to 
coordinate logistics and lift requirements with the other component commanders. That is not 
the intent of the XDOCE and the CJFSCC should maintain sustainment expertise as part of the 
staff that can interface with each of the other functional component commanders to consolidate 
sustainment requirements and to develop and execute a sustainment plan as part of their general 
staff responsibilities. 
However, a CJFSCC XDOCE, fully manned with domain warfare specialists, could leverage 
domain assessments from the other functional component commanders to advise the CJFSCC on 
operational access and protection issues. For example, a Maritime XDOCE rep on the CJFSCC 
staff would help the CJFSCC understand the operational access and protection requirements 
associated with operating sustainment assets in the maritime domain. This would assist the 
CJFSCC in either articulating their protection requirements to the other component commanders 
or executing these missions themselves, should the CJFSCC be entrusted with that responsibility 
for assigned forces. 
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Recommendation 2.5: The CONOPS should be modified to include a discussion of the 
uniqueness of the CJFSCC XDOCE, including how the roles and responsibilities of the CJFSCC 
XDOCE related to operational access and protection support CJFSCC mission accomplishment. 
Organizational Composition 
Cross-Domain Expertise and CJTU Staffs 
Finding 2.6: CJTU staffs must possess the requisite cross-domain expertise to effectively 
employ all forces assigned to the CJTU Commander. 
Discussion: The CONOPS states that “The XDOCE is purpose-built to address the assigned 
mission & areas of expertise not already present within the staff. The number of experts per 
domain or warfighting function will depend on the scale and scope of the operation.” In 
Global ’15, there was one “Lead” XDOCE rep assigned to the JTF staff (Tier 2), with each FCC 
(Tier 3) having reps from each of the “other” domains. For example, the Combined Joint Forces 
Land Component Commander (or CJFLCC) XDOCE had air, maritime, cyber and space domain 
reps, but no land domain rep, since land domain expertise was resident in the core CJFLCC staff. 
The CJTSCC XDOCE, while not responsible for a particular domain, had air, maritime, land and 
cyber, but no space rep, since it was envisioned that the SCC would not require such expertise to 
accomplish its mission. 
While the game only had XDOCE’s at the Tier 2 and 3 levels, the players often commented on 
the appropriateness of the XDOCE for the Tier 4 or TU/CJTU level. Some believed that a CJTU 
could benefit from the cross-domain expertise that an XDOCE would provide, while others felt 
that a CJTU staff would have such expertise by its very nature as a joint task unit staff. 
Regardless of whether such expertise is organic to the staff or provided by an XDOCE, there did 
seem to be a need for XDOCE-like capabilities at the CJTU in order to understand and be able to 
employ cross-domain solutions effectively. When establishing a CJTU, the CJTU Commander 
must ensure that his staff possesses the necessary cross-domain expertise - either organic or 
augmented by a purpose-built XDOCE - to effectively employ all capabilities assigned. This was 
illustrated by the following player comment: 
“Need a Tier 4 XDOCE manned with experts in weapon systems attached to 
their CJTU. Can’t have Tier 4 taking actions on attached weapon systems for 
which they have no experience, and especially, [no] understanding of the RISK 
they are incurring.” 
Recommendation 2.6: The CONOPS should emphasize the need for a CJTU staff to possess the 
requisite cross-domain expertise, either organic or augmented by a purpose-built XDOCE, to 
effectively employ all assigned forces.  
COMBINED JOINT TASK UNIT (CJTU)  
Strengths And Weaknesses 
“With the understanding of, education for, and training using mission command 
as the philosophic method to warfight this may work if the commander and staff at 
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the CJTU are comfortable operating with limited information from his/her higher 
headquarters.” 
– Global 14’ Player 
Current Service Task Forces and CJTUs 
Finding 3.1: The relationship between CJTUs and existing service task force organizations are 
not well defined and understood.  
Discussion: The CONOPS does not adequately discuss the differences and similarities between 
existing service task force structures and the CJTU concept, and how they interrelate during both 
peacetime and conflict. The CJTU construct was suggested by some players as “another layer of 
bureaucracy” that may duplicate existing structures at the task force level. Carrier Strike Groups 
(CSGs), Air Force Air Expeditionary Wings (AEWs), Marine Air-Ground Task Force 
(MAGTFs), and Army Battalion Task Force were highlighted as examples of service specific 
organizations that currently integrate capabilities across different domains to achieve a specific 
mission. However, players concluded that combining specific capabilities from across these 
structures would enhance cross-domain synergy and operational integration by providing tactical 
commanders more options to rapidly gain domain superiority and achieve operational access 
early in a conflict, and quickly respond to changing situations or establish an advantage in some 
combination of domains. Accordingly, the CONOPS suggests that the CJTU concept is similar to 
any other tactical force under a functional component, except that it has the potential to integrate 
capabilities in all domains-including space and cyberspace- across services and nations. If 
current TUs and CJTUs are expected to operate together under the same command, “then 
planners and operators need to acquire a better understanding of the roles and responsibilities 
between them” and how forces from TUs are assigned to CJTUs. Some players suggested that 
removing forces from current TUs and placing them under the command of a CJTU during a 
conflict could help or hinder future options and capabilities available to tactical commanders. 
Specifically, some players posited that establishing CJTUs might reduce cohesion of current 
service organizations (MAGTF, CSG, etc.), while others suggested that the benefit would be 
lasting and far-reaching for both the staff and tactical forces. Understanding this relationship 
warrants further examination and consideration for inclusion into the CONOPS.  
Recommendation 3.1: The CONOPS should identify the similarities and differences between 
existing service task unit structures and the CJTU concept; the roles and responsibilities between 
existing service task force units and CJTUs prior to and during a conflict; and the benefits and 
unintended consequences of integrating capabilities from standing TUs into CJTUs. 
Organizational Composition 
CJTU Mission and Deconfliction Requirements 
Finding 3.2: CJTUs should be tailored and scaled based on mission, line of operation, and/or a 
geographical area of responsibility in order to integrate forces and effects from multiple domains 
in an A2/AD environment. 
Discussion: The CJTU, as it is currently written, brings together forces from two or more 
services and two or more domains for a specific mission, line of effort or geographic area. 
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Players largely agreed that the creation and design of a CJTU should be based on a specific 
mission or task to be completed. One player noted the following: 
“This idea works great at Tier 4 as long as it was created for a specific mission in 
space or time. In other words, their mission is to take island X, or their mission is 
to attrite land forces in a certain area from Time 0 to time X. Otherwise, there is 
potential to just morph into a regular Task Unit.” 
Players compared the CJTU to the German concept of building on the fly Kamfgruppe for 
specific missions and for a finite time. As one player noted, “It took them a generation to 
inculcate this concept into their forces. If we are serious about this, we need to be prepared to 
devote the time, money and resources to train and grow the folks that can command CJTUs 
effectively.” Similarly, another player suggested that “the danger of loose mission command and 
higher level intent is that all CJTUs could end up attacking the same target or ignoring a threat. 
Coordination is still needed. When missions are assigned to the CJTU they need specific 
boundaries in order to give them the freedom to act.” Accordingly, the CJTU would need to be 
mission oriented, operating within clearly delineated geographical boundaries. Finally, some 
players suggested that CJTUs may operate most effectively when organized into smaller units 
over a short time period.  
Recommendation 2.2: The CONOPS should include relevant examples or ‘use-cases’ for CJTU 
employment, such as Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD), to help readers understand the 
CJTU construct, while also highlighting the need to specifically delineate area of responsibilities 
for assigned CJTUs to reduce coordination requirements and provide for improved freedom of 
action. Additionally, such mission-tailored CJTU’s should be integrated into joint exercises and 
war games to further their development and acceptance. 
Standing and Ad Hoc CJTUs and Training Implications  
Finding 3.3: Both standing and ad hoc CJTUs may be required to deal with dynamic operational 
environments.  
Discussion: Whether standing or ad hoc, players posited that the integration of capabilities 
across domains and services provides component commanders greater options to manage 
complex operations in an A2/AD environment. Both standing and ad hoc CJTUs were posited to 
enhance a commander’s ability to establish superiority in some combination of domains in order 
to enable freedom of action required by the mission. The CONOPS suggests that CJTUs should 
be formed during crisis planning, “where the CJTU is formed with no prior integration or 
training,” and prior to a conflict “with time to create synergy, team unity, and common TTPs 
among the CJTU forces.” Players emphasized that both standing and ad hoc CJTUs should be 
guided by common organizational principles, plans, procedures, and protocols. Several players 
posited that risk to mission and forces would increase if CJTUs were not afforded adequate pre-
deployment or pre-operation joint training. As one player noted, “By specifying a finite number 
of possible CJTU’s, not only can a fixed number be certified, but training for the personnel in the 
CJTU’s can be standardized and roles, responsibilities, and TTPs can be formalized and 
implemented throughout the force.” Players suggested that both approaches have significant 
costs in terms of time, money, and resources required to fundamentally change the way the 
services organize, train, and equip its forces.  
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Some players posited that CJTUs may be “too dynamic to be certified, and any attempt to certify 
it would limit a commander’s flexibility in forming a CJTU when urgently needed for a specific 
mission.” If certification is required for a CJTU, “the UK method to certify staff and 
commanders to meet a number of missions” is worth considering. However, certifying the staffs 
still leaves individual units uncertified to work together in the CJTU construct. One player who 
supported CJTU certification stated, “I like the idea that CJTUs are purpose-built and require 
certification. This will mean that we only have a handful of CJTU “types” that are well 
understood and we can train to them.”  
Recommendation 3.3: The CONOPS should specify that while standing or pre-identified 
CJTUs would be the preferred approach (due to training and certification issues), ad hoc CJTUs 
may also serve a valuable function. The CONOPS should also clearly explain who is responsible 
for identifying the conditions or criteria for creating a CJTU during peacetime and in crises; 
discuss who retains the responsibility and authority to establish a standing or ad hoc CJTU; and 
identify the process for establishing and disestablishing a CJTU whether it is standing or ad hoc. 
In addition, CJTU training and certification requirements should be identified, with existing fleet 
and coalition certification procedures considered as a starting point. 
XDOCE and CJTU Operations 
Finding 3.4: Maintaining cross-domain expertise on the CJTU staff is a critical enabler for 
integrating kinetic and non-kinetic effects and capabilities from multiple domains into CJTU 
operations.  
Discussion: Players concluded that CJTU staffs require a high degree of joint experience and 
expertise at a relatively junior level. They noted that current joint and service doctrine, training, 
and education is not sufficient to employ CJTUs. The CJTU concept will require a fundamental 
change to joint education and career progression and force the services to relinquish core service 
or domain competencies to support other functional component commanders on a permanent 
basis. While many theater and national assets may never be assigned to a CJTU commander, 
CJTU planners must maintain the resident expertise on their staffs to understand how these 
capabilities effect operations across the information domain and the traditional warfare domains. 
As one player noted: “We must train to integrate these systems into the theater of operations -- 
the CJTU must operate in all 5 domains simultaneously, for no other reason than our adversary 
does.”  
Players suggested that “in order for the full brunt of the cross-domain and joint assets to be 
effectively used, the ‘ninja warriors’ that were proposed for the XDOCE concept” would also be 
required for the CJTU. In fact, some believed that there would be no need for an XDOCE if the 
CJTU were comprised of experienced warfighters from across the services. This notion 
compliments the CONOPS, which suggests that as joint planners become more adept at cross-
domain integration, the need for an XDOCE and the added manpower requirement will no longer 
be required. One player noted, “beef-up the CJTU and CJTF staffs with smart cross-domain 
planners and there is no need for an XDOCE.” Similarly, another player suggested, “for CJTUs 
to be effective, they would need a full staff of joint SMEs capable of using the right kit 
regardless of domain to achieve an effect.”  
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While the CONOPS generally describes the composition and responsibilities of the XDOCEs 
assigned to a CJTU staff, it does not explain the interaction between XDOCE planners and 
traditional planning teams assigned to existing task units. In addition to maintaining cross-
domain expertise to plan and execute fires operations, a CJTU staff should be comprised of 
sustainment, intelligence, and communications experts skilled in supporting cross-domain 
operations at both the operational and tactical level. Maintaining this level of expertise at the Tier 
4 level is critical when planning and executing cross-domain operations in a time constrained and 
communications degraded environment.  
The CONOPS suggests that the composition of the CJTU staff should reflect the cross-service 
and combined composition of the forces assigned to the CJTU to ensure those employing the 
forces have a thorough knowledge of their capabilities and limitations. However, given that 
CJTUs may be created on the fly and re-organized to meet emerging mission requirements, 
CJTU staffs must possess a comprehensive knowledge of capabilities, limitations, and effects in 
all domains to tactically exploit the adversary, even when communication with senior and peer 
commanders is unavailable. This suggests that Tier 4 XDOCEs should possess similar 
knowledge, skills, and abilities as Tier 3 XDOCEs, but further consideration should be given to 
exploring additional qualities and attributes of a CJTU staff officer beyond just filling the job of 
a typical staff officer or LNO type billet.  
Recommendation 3.4: The CONOPS should explain the interaction between XDOCE planners 
and traditional planning teams assigned to existing CJTU staffs; discuss the roles and 
responsibilities, and required knowledge and skillset of sustainment, intelligence, and 
communications planners assigned to CJTU staffs; and discuss the requisite knowledge and 
skillset required to integrate new capabilities and forces into an existing CJTU.  
Authorities 
Achieving Mission Success through Increased Command Authority  
Finding 3.5: Having the ability to change mission, time, and force at the tactical level enabled 
commanders to rapidly respond and adapt to a wide range of missions across the JOA.  
Discussion: ‘TACON-plus’ was a notional authority created for the game that allowed 
commanders to change mission, time, and place of forces. Over the course of game play, 
functional component commanders increasingly delegated ‘TACON-plus’ to their Tier 4 
commanders. Many players suggested that they would need authorities similar to ‘TACON-plus’ 
to effectively command capabilities in all five domains. However, some viewed it as a “crutch” 
that gave CJTU commanders “too much authority, therefore causing too much ‘out of sync’ with 
[the] component command[s] when executing the next set of orders.” Furthermore, some players 
acknowledged that “rather than following a set of orders to attack different targets, CJTU 
Commanders might begin attacking the same targets all at once and leaving other enemy units 
unengaged.” While the CONOPS encourages the need to delegate greater authority to CJTU 
commanders, it does not discuss potential risks or consequences for doing so. The following 
player comment highlights this concern: 
Throwing a bunch of CJTUs in a geographic area, all capable of operating in 
multiple domains, then giving ‘TACON -plus’ to the respective CJTUs, then 
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degrading comms to all is a recipe for disaster in terms of unity of effort (there 
will be none) risk to friendly forces (there will be lots) and ultimately failure to 
accomplish mission objectives. 
In general, however, the players concluded that increased levels of command authority at the 
tactical level decreases decision-making time by eliminating the need to coordinate with 
superiors to acquire permissions and capabilities. Having the expertise, authorities, and 
capabilities organic to a CJTU Commander enables mission command and allows commanders 
to quickly adjust and respond to changing conditions in the battle space. Players emphasized that 
tactical commanders will increasingly rely on such ‘OPCON-minus’ authority as both the 
operating environment and communications with higher authority deteriorates.  
Recommendation 3.5: Revise the CONOPS to state that CJTU commanders should be 
delegated most of the authorities associated with OPCON (except for the authority to relieve 
commanders’ of attached forces) via establishing directives in order to enable them to effectively 
exercise mission command, particularly in response to the challenges posed to C2 in a 
communications degraded or denied environment. 
Processes 
CJTU Operations and Battlespace Management 
Finding 3.7: CJTUs require increased coordination and situational awareness to prevent 
fratricide, overlaps, and seams. 
Discussion: Players suggested that integrating joint capabilities and managing the deconfliction 
process for concurrent fires missions remains a significant challenge today. The nature of cross-
domain operations in a congested A2/AD environment increases the deconfliction problem for 
CJTU Commanders performing simultaneous missions with forces operating in the air, maritime, 
land, space and cyberspace domains. While players found the notional game processes and 
products beneficial to gain situational awareness and deconflict forces, they recognized that 
current processes, procedures, and products at the Tier 4 level do not account for this level of 
coordination within and across domains.  
During the game, the Domain Coordination Order (DCO) was published for each domain by the 
lead component commander for that domain (CJFMCC for the maritime domain, CJFACC for 
the air domain, CJFLCC for the land domain, and the CJFICC for both the space and cyberspace 
domains). The DCOs served a purpose similar to current airspace control orders, water space 
management plans, and fire support coordination orders. Units operating under the authority of 
different Tier 3 commanders in the same area who did not appear on a common DCO (i.e. all 
aircraft on the ACO, all ships on the MCO, etc.) risked committing fratricide during the Combat 
Operations phase. While the gaming environment provided Tier 4 players with perfect 
communication and situational awareness of the JOA, the players acknowledged “a product like 
the DCO would be necessary to gain situational awareness and coordinate forces and effects 
within and across sections of the JOA.” 
Moreover, players at the Tier 3 and Tier 4 levels discussed the need to maintain a shared 
Integrated Task Order (ITO) and common operating picture that describes and depicts which 
Findings and Recommendations 
35 
commands and forces are allocated to specific tasks, missions, and domains across the theater. A 
notional product similar to this was prepared by each Tier 3 commander and sent to Tier 4 task 
unit commanders to support the employment of their assigned forces. It brought all aspects of 
C2, targeting, maneuver, kinetic and non-kinetic fires, and logistics together in a single order to 
enable operations at the task unit level. 
Although many players perceived the DCO and ITO as essential products to reduce fratricide and 
synergize planning efforts, several players questioned whether it would replace or complement 
existing real-world products that are in-place today. In order to reduce the likelihood of fratricide 
and prevent overlaps and gaps, tactical commanders may be required to adopt new processes and 
procedures to coordinate and deconflict forces and desired effects within and across domains. 
The CONOPS suggests that XDOCEs are responsible for developing plans that include battle-
space control measures, domain management, restricted operations zones, and fire support 
coordination measures; however, the CONOPS does not identify the types of processes and 
products that a CJTU is required to develop or contribute to during current and future planning.  
Recommendation 2.7: The CONOPS should identify relevant processes and products at the Tier 
4 level that are required to deconflict forces and effects within and across domains, including 
how existing process and products can be modified to serve this purpose, while also enabling 
CJTU’s to manage their local battlespace when required. 
COMBINED JOINT FORCE SUSTAINMENT COMPONENT COMMANDER 
Strengths And Weakness 
 
“The game only allowed the CJFSCC to play 1 1/2 of the 6 or so objectives for 
the CJFSCC…the CJFSCC construct should be considered for a future game to 
test its ability to provide Operational Contracting Support, Host Nation Support, 
Interagency Logistics, Allied/Partner Logistics, etc.” 
 – Global ’14 Player 
Enhancing Unity of Effort and Operational Integration at the Cost of Simplicity  
Finding 4.1: The CJFSCC could enhance the ability to synchronize sustainment requirements 
across component commanders and integrate joint, interagency, and multinational 
sustainment forces at the operational level; however, tactical execution decisions risk being 
misaligned with the CJFSCC’s sustainment plan in a communications denied or degraded 
environment.  
Discussion: Several players suggested that the CJFSCC may enhance unity of effort and 
operational integration by serving as the single point of contact for engaging TRANSCOM, 
DLA, and multinational partners. Similarly, standardizing procedures, systems, and point of 
contacts-to include the operational plans and requirements of component commanders- may 
minimize inefficiencies in joint operations. As one player noted, the CJFSCC may 
“streamline multiple flows of supply into a single supply chain …and minimize the logistics 
footprint, forces, people, commodities, and resources required to accomplish its mission.” 
When sustainment forces and supply are at its highest demand, some suggested that the 
CJFSCC synchronizes sustainment requirements and priority of effort at the operational level. 
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The CJFSCC was thought to have provided component commanders greater flexibility to 
shift priorities, which would allow them to focus on combat employment. The following 
player comment highlights the benefit of the SCC from the perspective of the CJTF: 
“There was Centralized command and sustainment from the viewpoint of the 
CJTF. We felt like the CJFSCC could provide sustainability of the ENTIRE plan 
in real time. Synchronizing in near real time and tracking via XDOCE and the 
plan being put in place; whether or not you felt you were giving us your most up 
to date info.” 
Similarly, some Tier 3 players suggested that they were more comfortable assuming greater 
risk in combat missions when communication and coordination between the CJFSCC was 
greatest. The following comment is representative of players who viewed the CJFSCC as a 
valuable contribution to game play: 
Much like a super J4, it [CJFSCC] allowed us to accomplish what we needed. If 
the A2/AD environment degrades, our ability to [control is reduced, and we must] 
let lower echelons use their initiative to achieve the mission; it’s going to be 
important to trust subordinates and push authority down. 
However, command authority of all operational sustainment forces may require greater 
coordination and situational awareness between the CJFSCC and component commanders to 
mitigate redundancies and ensure mission success. The ‘pushing’ and ‘pulling’ of 
sustainment requirements and capabilities emerged as a major source of contention between 
the CJFSCC and Tier 3 Commanders. For the most part, the CJFSCC only pushed 
sustainment capabilities when requested by component commanders. Working through the 
CJFSCC XDOCEs, component commanders relied on the CJFSCC to push capabilities 
based on their overall plan. This tension often pulled players away from planning combat 
missions and increased the need to coordinate and communicate with peer and subordinate 
commands. In a contested A2/AD environment, players suggested that the CJFSCC must 
have the capability to anticipate future requirements and push logistics forward. The 
following player comments highlight this disconnect.  
“CJFACC asked for airlift to move jammers to proper locations and should have 
been allowed to send NEED and get prioritized IAW entire theater need--not 
rejected without submission. CJFSCC is a good idea to prevent dupe work but it’s 
going to require a lot of coordination to ensure all missions are met.” 
“The CJFSCC needs to push material base on situational awareness of plans/ops 
(vs pull) to all of us at the Tier 3 level. All Component Commanders need high 
level, if not same level, of joint situational awareness to better integrate and 
synchronize sustainment requirements and resources.” 
“We need Logistics to be pushed, and following our schemes of maneuver.” 
Recommendation 4.1: The CONOPS should address the relationship between component 
commanders and the CJFSCC as it relates to anticipating future requirements and 
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proactively providing sustainment capabilities, especially in a communications denied and 
degraded environment. 
Roles And Responsibilities 
SCC or JTF J4 
Finding 4.2: It is unclear whether centralized sustainment is needed, and if so, whether the 
CJFSCC or JTF J4 should assume such responsibilities.  
Discussion: Players were divided on whether the sustainment function needed to be 
centralized under a single entity, and if so, whether it should be carried out by a new 
component commander or handled by the JTF J4. Those in favor of the J4 suggested that 
adding a new component commander for sustainment would create span of control issues, 
particularly in a communications degraded or denied environment. Current and future 
resource concerns were cited as major barriers to creating a separate command structure 
when perhaps the responsibilities could be carried out by sustainment liaisons embedded 
into today’s C2 structure. Conversely, some suggested that reducing overlaps and 
synchronizing efforts across the force would end up saving the department of defense over the 
long-term. 
Others indicated that if the CJFSCC responsibilities were to include force protection 
responsibilities for the sustainment forces, including APODs and SPODs, then perhaps a 
separate entity would be required. The UK logistics model that is responsible for managing 
strategic lift to theatre for extensive land campaigns was cited as one possible model upon 
which to base the CJFSCC, based on its success at sustaining combat forces in theater.  
Recommendation 4.2: Additional analysis should be undertaken to determine whether a 
centralized approach to sustainment is needed. If centralization is chosen as the preferred 
approach, then additional analysis should be undertaken to determine if the CJFSCC is 
better served to perform such a mission, rather than by the J4 on a JTF or Combatant 
Commander staff.  
Management of the TPFDD (Time-Phased Force & Deployment Data) 
Finding 4.3: There is confusion over the appropriate role of the CJFSCC regarding the 
TPFDD, as well as the transfer of command authority between TRANSCOM, CJTF, and 
the CJFSCC.  
Discussion: Players were divided on whether the TPFDD should be managed by the 
CJFSCC or the JTF Commander. A shared responsibility where by the JTF manages 
combat forces and the CJFSCC manages sustainment forces into theater could result in 
gaps, seams, and overlaps that would disconnect these forces, especially in a 
communications denied or degraded environment. One player noted, “I fully agree that 
the CJFSCC should manage the TPFDD...during game play, some of us actually thought 
they were. In reality, the CJFSCC would manage the flow of sustainment forces into theater 
to TRANSCOM via the JTF Commander.” If the JTF were to manage inter-theater 
sustainment and combat forces, then the J4 would assume a broader role in working with the 
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CJFSCC to ensure that forces arrive at the time and place designated by the CJFSCC. The 
following player comments highlight this discrepancy:  
“CJFSCC’s don’t write the TPFDD - but they can enable it, and generate the 
Theatre sustainment/basing requirements in order to give the warfighter what he 
actually wants/needs - which is not a bit of kit - but a capability.” 
“The CJTF should plan TPFDD (with input from CJFMCC, CJFACC, CJFLCC 
and CJFICC) and the CJFSCC should execute accomplishing the who, what, 
where and when in getting it there.” 
Moreover, players had a limited understanding of the transfer of command authority of 
sustainment forces between TRANSCOM, the CJTF, and the CJFSCC. More broadly, 
players frequently highlighted the need to better understand the relationship between 
TRANSCOM, CJTF, and CJFSCC, as well as their associated inputs and outputs over 
phases of a campaign. A common operating picture and persistent coordination and planning 
between TRANSCOM, CJTF, and the CJFSCC is increasingly important to support inter- 
and intra-theater sustainment in an A2/AD environment.  
Recommendation 4.3: The CONOPS should specify that the CJTF is responsible for 
managing the TPFDD, but that the CJFSCC supports the CJTF by ensuring that the plan is 
logistically sustainable. Additionally, the CONOPS should specifically identify the 
relationship between TRANSCOM, the CJTF, and the CJFSCC to reduce confusion 
regarding roles and responsibilities.  
Operational Protection of Fixed and Mobile Forces and Infrastructure  
Finding 4.4: The responsibility for protecting sustainment forces and associated land-based 
infrastructure warrants further examination.  
Discussion: The risk posed to sustainment forces both at sea and ashore was frequently 
highlighted during game play. Some players suggested that the CJFSCC should maintain its 
own combat forces to protect sustainment assets, while others posited that assigning combat 
forces to the CJFSCC would take away from accomplishing more important combat 
missions. The CONOPS states that even though the CJFSCC does not provide operational 
protection of sustainment assets, it must identify and prioritize Force Protection 
requirements related to bases, supplies, and lines of communication (LOCs). Several players 
suggested that CJTUs should be assigned to the CJFSCC to protect both mobile and fixed 
sustainment forces; this may remove a layer of coordination and complexity and potentially 
increase the likelihood that sustainment forces will be adequately defended/protected. This 
assertion runs contrary to the CONOPS, which requires CJTUs assigned to the CJFSCC to 
rely on support from other functional component commanders for their defense/protection.  
Recommendation 4.4: Further analysis should be undertaken to determine whether the 
CJFSCC should be responsible for operational protection for any or all of its assigned forces 
in the air, land and maritime domains, along with associated infrastructure, with the results 
incorporated into the CONOPS.  
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Authorities 
Benefits of Increased Authorities  
Finding 4.5: Having the authority to change mission, time, and place of sustainment forces 
enabled CJFSCC-assigned CJTU Commanders to meet mission requirements. 
Discussion: Players acknowledged the benefits of pushing greater authorities down to CJTU 
and TU Commanders. Having the authority to change mission, time, and place of 
sustainment forces enabled CJFSCC-assigned CJTU Commanders to rapidly adapt to 
emerging mission requirements. Even though Tier 4 players had perfect situational 
awareness and communications, they acknowledged that they had limited knowledge of 
sustainment operations and CJFSCC plans. One player noted the following: 
“For most of the operations we were doing with the CJFSCC, what we were very 
focused on was what level of TACON or ‘TACON-plus’ we had. If it was TACON, 
we didn’t feel comfortable going beyond mission; with ‘TACON-plus’ we went 
beyond that point.”  
However, the authority to change mission, time, and place of sustainment forces 
occasionally misaligned CJFSCC plans with their CJTUs actions. This misalignment 
increased when communications between them were limited or denied. Moreover, the 
relationship between Directive Authority for Logistics (DAFL) and the delegation of 
OPCON, TACON, and ‘TACON-plus’ to tactical commanders was not well understood.  
Recommendation 4.5: CJTU authorities should include the ability to change the assigned 
mission, time and place for assigned or attached forces, based on an understanding of 
commander’s intent and the CJFSCC plan. Additionally, the CONOPS should be modified 
to explain the implications for the DAFL, based on the increased command authorities 
assigned to the CJFSCC and its subordinates. 
Interagency and Multinational Operational Integration      
Finding 4.6: Partners and allies remain essential to execute cross-domain operations in a 
complex A2/AD environment and understanding how they integrate into the CJFSCC 
requires further examination.  
Discussion: The CONOPS suggests that the CJFSCC “must be capable of sustaining joint 
combat forces and interagency and multinational partners, from strategic-level national 
providers to forward units at the tactical level, while minimizing the logistics footprint in the 
area of operations”. In an era of Combined Joint Task Units, players suggested that 
sustainment planners and operators at each level of the C2 structure must improve their 
understanding of the critical capabilities and barriers that help or hinder operational 
integration of interagency and multinational sustainment forces. The importance of 
establishing and maintaining basing and overflight access with regional partners and allies 
was frequently highlighted as a critical element to intra-theater sustainment of joint forces in 
an A2/AD environment.  
U.S. Naval War College Global 2014 Report 
40 
As the single point of contact with international partners, several players suggested that the 
CJFSCC should be a standing organization that enables planners and operators to develop 
trust and confidence with multinational forces through persistent cooperation in the areas of 
information sharing, planning, and training. Under this premise, the CJFSCC would need to 
establish a formalized process that allows planners and operators to work together on a more 
formal and consistent basis in peacetime. This will provide U.S. and international planners 
and operators the opportunity to develop a shared awareness and understanding of how to 
work with each other when planning and conducting sustainment operations in future 
A2/AD environments. Similar to current functional component commanders in peacetime, 
the CJFSCC would be a standing organization responsible for planning sustainment 
operations for each combatant commander’s area of responsibility, planning and executing 
joint and combined sustainment training exercises, and exercising command and control of 
sustainment operations in peacetime and wartime.  
The CONOPS states, that “The Combined Joint Force Sustainment Commander must 
minimize contracting officers and sustainment contractors.” In order to do so, players 
suggested creating a separate office within the CJFSCC responsible for managing 
Operational Contract Support (OCS) with interagency and multinational partners. As the 
single Operational level sustainment interface for our Allies and Partners, this office would 
be responsible for working with the GCC J4 and JTF J4 to ensure that Host Nation Support 
arrangements and Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA) are in alignment 
with operational sustainment plans. The CJFSCC would work with interagency and 
multinational partners to identify, integrate, and synchronize the types of support-including 
food, fuel, transportation, and ammunition- to execute the campaign plan.  
Recommendation 4.6: The CONOPS should highlight the importance and role of allies and 
partners in executing the CJFSCC mission and identify critical capabilities and potential 
barriers to integrating multinational sustainment forces. 
Communications and Intelligence Support to the CJFSCC 
Finding 4.7: Reliable communications and intelligence is critical to executing the CJFSCC 
mission, particularly in an A2/AD environment.  
Discussion: Players frequently highlighted the importance of protecting logistics data and 
communications from adversary exploitation and manipulation. Players highlighted that the 
CJFSCC must create contingency plans as the A2/AD environment changes and adjust “as 
necessary for continued connectivity and timeliness of sustainment.” The CJFSCC portion 
of the CONOPS does not reflect the need to develop “back-up plans” or characterize the 
type of guidance that would help planners and operators understand how to coordinate and 
communicate with the CJFSCC in order to sustain combat forces throughout the conflict.  
Moreover, the CONOPS also suggests that the “XDOCE will provide the systems 
connectivity and capacity for XDO C2.” Players frequently emphasized the importance of 
defending logistics networks and ensuring that the SCC XDOCE maintains the resident 
cyber and communications expertise to do so. Regardless of whether the CJFSCC or J-4 
manages sustainment, players acknowledged the importance of operational and tactical 
intelligence to support the movement and protection of fixed and mobile forces at sea and 
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ashore. Similar to other component commanders, players advocated for integrating a J-2 
staff and its associated processes into the existing CJFSCC organizational structure.  
While the CONOPS vaguely describes intelligence and information support to the JTF and 
CJTUs, it does not discuss its role in support of the CJFSCC. The CONOPS relies on the 
XDOCE to comply with established Joint C2 data exchange standards to accelerate data 
sharing across the operational and intelligence communities. The importance of intelligence 
and communications to the CJFSCC while planning, directing, monitoring, and assessing 
sustainment operations throughout each phase of the campaign plan is worthy of future 
examination and inclusion into the CONOPS. Specifically, the following information should 
be discussed in depth: how to coordinate and integrate information and intelligence to support 
the sustainment commander; and specific guidance on what information or intelligence is 
needed, where to get it from, and when to send or push it out between commanders.  
Moreover, given the need to acquire and process information and intelligence, players were 
uncertain of who would “own” the land, sea, air, cyber, and space ISR platforms tasked to 
support the CJFSCC. Several players suggested that component commanders would support 
the CJFSCC in this role, while others advocated for temporally “chopping” these forces to 
the CJFSCC to conduct specific missions. Nevertheless, the CONOPS should describe how 
ISR and communications is acquired and processed at the Tier 3 level and its relation to 
CJTUs or TUs. One player comment suggested the following:  
“There could be a scenario where the CJFSCC needs CJFICC capability added 
to one of their CJTUs - EW and ISR are potential examples. Likewise, it is 
reasonable to consider CJFSCC assets transferred to the CJFICC to achieve an 
objective. A relay-equipped cargo aircraft, transferred to the CJFICC, providing 
a Communications Bridge may be a good example.” 
Recommendation 4.7: The CONOPS should highlight the role and responsibilities of 
communications and intelligence personnel in support of the CJFSCC mission, incorporate a 
J-2 and J-6 staff into the CJFSCC organization, and discuss who maintains control authority 
over ISR assets supporting CJFSCC mission requirements.  
ANALYTIC HIERARCHY PROCESS RESULTS 
 
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is a 
decision support tool that uses a series of 
pair-wise comparisons between criteria and 
options to determine collective criteria 
weighting and the resulting relative option 
ranking based on the degree to which the 
options meet the criteria. 
Global ’14 participants were divided into 
three cohorts based on their roles in the 
game – Tier 2 (JTF), Tier 3 (Component Figure ?: C2 Criteria Weighting 
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Commands) and Tier 4 (CJTUs and TUs). The Tier 3 cohort was then sub-divided into the five 
components (referred to here as the ACC, MCC, LCC, ICC and SCC). 
During the final combined plenary session, participants were first asked to compare the relative 
importance of the six criteria to effective command and control. Using the mean data for all 
participants, the resultant criteria weighting is depicted above.  
Using this weighting, the cohorts evaluated the degree to which each attribute (XDOCE, CJTU, 
ICC and SCC) demonstrated or contributed to the criteria in terms of an overall C2 system. Put 
another way, how desirable were each of the four attributes in terms of contributing to a C2 
system’s overall unity of effort, flexibility, simplicity, resiliency, operational integration and 
cross domain synergy?  
 
Figure ?: C2 Attribute Evaluation by Tier 
Tier 2 and Tier 3 responses were closely matched, with the ICC attribute scoring highest and the 
SCC scoring lowest for both Tier 2 and 3. Conversely, Tier 4 scored the CJTU highest and the 
XDOCE lowest. 
Taking the Tier 3 results above and breaking them into their constituent component commander 
parts produces the following results.  
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Figure ?: C2 Attribute Evaluation by Component 
ACC, MCC, ICC and SCC scored the ICC highest, while LCC scored the XDOCE highest. 
ACC, MCC and LCC scored the SCC lowest; ICC scored the CJTU lowest; SCC scored the 
XDOCE lowest.  
For Tier 2, unity of effort and cross-domain synergy were the dominant factors contributing to 
the high ICC score, as indicated by the graphs on the following page.8 
 
                                                
8 Corner bar graphs show the relative criterion weighting and ranking for each tier. 
   
Figure 8: Unity of Effort Assessment 
by C2 Attribute and Tier 
Figure 7: Cross-Domain Synergy Assessment 
by C2 Attribute and Tier 
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For Tier 4, flexibility, operational integration and cross-domain synergy were the most 
significant criteria contributing to the CJTU high score, as indicated primarily by the following 
graphs, as well as the cross-domain synergy graph above. 
Simplicity and resiliency had the least amount of variation between the tiers and the attributes, 
and therefore did little to discriminate between the attributes.  
Consistent with Miles’ Law9, i.e. “Where you stand depends on where you sit,” Tiers 2 and 3 
saw the greatest utility in the ICC and XDOCE attributes, as those attributes were embedded and 
exercised at those levels. Similarly, Tier 4 saw the greatest value in the CJTU as it was exercised 
at their level, while the XDOCE and other Tier 3 entities were largely “out of sight, out of 
mind,” outside of receiving the periodic task orders and sending turn reports. This essentially 
resulted in an ‘out of phase’ outcome; where Tier 2 and 3 scored an attribute high, Tier 4 scored 
it low, and vice-versa.  
AHP does not directly tell us anything more about the four attributes in terms of changes to the 
draft CONOP. It does suggest that if further development and analysis is desired with regard to 
C2 of cross-domain operations in A2/AD environments, then the priority for investigation should 
be: 
1. ICC 
2. XDOCE 
3. CJTU 
4. SCC	  
                                                
9 Rufus E. Miles, Jr. (1910-1996) was an assistant secretary under Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson. 
He developed Miles’ Law and Six Other Maxims of Management; “Where you stand depends on where you sit,” i.e. 
we see things and form judgments of things from our own perspective. 
 
Figure 9: Flexibility Assessment by 
C2 Attribute and Tier 
Figure 10: Op Integration Assessment by 
C2 Attribute and Tier 
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SUMMARY OF PLAYER-DERIVED THEMES 
 
“Joint XDO success is dependent upon level of expertise, authority, ability to 
work together, and trust up, down, and across the commands; must have rich joint 
operational expertise and experience to decide and act quicker than our 
adversary…communicating information is a fundamental problem of C2, and one 
that will only get worse in an A2/AD environment.”  
– Global ’14 Player  
Enabling Unity of Effort in Joint XDO 
Achieving unity of effort was the central challenge to effective joint cross-domain operations in 
an A2/AD environment. Three themes of expertise, authorities, and PDMA emerged as being 
most important to players for enabling unity of effort in joint cross-domain operations. Players 
concluded that no single service or nation has all the necessary capabilities to respond to the 
wide range of required missions across the JOA. Unfortunately, integrating and synchronizing 
capabilities across the joint force has been excessively complex and challenging. The challenge 
in joint cross-domain operations is not due to a lack of resources or capabilities, but rather in 
being able to quickly bring the right combination of capabilities together, regardless of service or 
nation, at the right time and place to achieve an effect. 
Expertise 
XDO 
Players emphasized that cross-domain operations would be necessary in future A2/AD 
environments to achieve effects from domains where access is greater and risk is lower. While 
each service has historically conducted cross-domain operations, players concluded that joint 
cross-domain operations require a higher level of integration and expertise. Players at each level 
of command recognized the lack of cross-domain expertise to plan and execute joint cross-
domain operations. Specifically, they proposed that joint planners and operators need to develop 
a broader knowledge base of joint capabilities operating in a single domain and the effects these 
capabilities can provide to gain or maintain access in other domains. The integration of cyber, 
space, and SOF at the operational and tactical level were three capability areas least understood 
by players. As one player noted, “We need to integrate SOF into planning efforts, especially as 
the CJFICC looks for ways to degrade Red C2 and prevent Red from degrading our C2.” 
Similarly, another player noted the following: 
“The greatest challenge with truly embracing the concept of the XDO is providing 
the commander with the requisite expertise to command space, cyberspace, air, 
maritime, and land units unilaterally and simultaneously. These domains are so 
different and so specialized from one another that the SME’s in that area 
currently provide direct support to a single commander.”  
Players concluded that current doctrine, education, and training does not sufficiently provide 
joint planners and operators with the knowledge and skills to effectively plan, direct, monitor, 
and assess joint cross-domain operations in an A2/AD environment. As one player noted: 
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“We haven’t done good integration because we’re playing the OLD way. We’re 
NOT looking at RISK and using a different force than our own to perform a 
mission with less risk. We’re trying to hit every nail with our OWN hammer. If I 
had the visibility and understanding of different capabilities, I would have used a 
different cross domain asset, but I didn’t.” 
Players emphasized that the joint community needs to develop, agree to, and understand 
definitions for each domain, as well as cross-domain operations. As one player noted, “How can 
we do cross- domain thinking when services have not clearly defined where some domains begin 
or end?” The participants suggested that cross-domain operations should become a core 
competency and that joint training cycles for operational and tactical planning staffs should be 
modified to include exercises involving cross-domain operations. Similarly, the joint 
professional military education (JPME) curriculum should integrate cross-domain operations as a 
complimentary approach for responding to the full spectrum of required missions, in both steady 
state and crises response. Finally, the joint community should develop and publish an 
overarching Cross-Domain Operations (XDO) Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) to 
complement the ASB Concept and Joint XDO C2 CONOPS and guide the development of future 
joint force capabilities. The capabilities and competencies for executing joint cross-domain 
operations in an A2/AD environment should be identified and trained to prior to conflict in order 
to effectively execute theater campaign plans.  
Joint XDO C2 CONOPS 
In order to assess the efficacy of the four C2 attributes moving forward, players concluded that 
the Joint XDO C2 CONOPS needs greater detail and the four attributes warrant further 
examination. Specially, players emphasized the need to better understand the relative strengths 
and weaknesses of the four attributes compared to the existing C2 system, as well as how their 
integration would impact current organizational structures, roles and responsibilities, processes, 
and authorities. For example, some questioned whether breaking up existing service 
organizations (e.g., CSG, MAGTF, etc.) to form CJTUs would reduce unit cohesion and mission 
effectiveness. Whether standing or ad hoc, players posited that all four C2 attributes would have 
significant Title 10 (organize, train, and equip) implications and further analysis is warranted to 
understand the short and long-term costs and benefits associated with implementation. 
Nevertheless, players agreed that the services should further integrate platforms and personnel to 
achieve future warfighting missions.  
Players emphasized the need to identify and remove barriers to effectively employ joint 
capabilities for cross-domain operations in an A2/AD environment. Leaders and 
organizations at all levels must find better ways to combine their efforts, resources, and 
capabilities to respond to future warfighting missions. As part of this effort, theater planners 
should determine which missions warrant the use of cross-domain operations, to include 
CJTUs. Many players suggested that junior personnel should have a greater role in exploring 
new and innovative command and control ideas and concepts, while others suggested that this 
demographic of leaders may lack sufficient experience and expertise to examine potential 
problems with current structures and processes. Enhancing joint XDO C2 requires new ways 
of thinking about and managing joint operations prior to and during a conflict. Leaders at all 
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levels must be open to evolving and adapting the legacy C2 system of today to meet future 
warfighting challenges.  
Air-Sea Battle Concept 
While not a new approach to warfare, players acknowledged that advanced adversary A2/AD 
capabilities would challenge the ability of U.S. and allied forces to gain and maintain operational 
access. Players concluded that theater campaign planning and design would benefit from using 
cross-domain operations to disrupt, destroy, and defeat adversary forces as envisioned in the Air-
Sea Battle Concept. However, many players reported they had not been exposed to the concept, 
thus developing a better understanding of it would only enhance their ability to plan and execute 
cross-domain operations in an A2/AD environment. Similar to the XDO Concept, operational 
and tactical leaders should ensure planning staffs gain a deeper understanding of the ASB 
Concept by first exploring threats posed by adversary A2/AD capabilities, how ASB might 
address these threats, and how ASB and XDO impacts service and joint force development.  
While service Title 10 war games continue to explore various aspects of the evolving A2/AD 
environment, Combatant Commanders should leverage the results of these efforts in their own 
war games and exercises to continue the examination of the ASB concept in realistic operational 
scenarios. Such events provide an effective forum for strengthening relationships between 
operational level and tactical level units, which is essential to effective implementation of the 
ASB Concept. The results of these efforts should be shared with other Combatant Commands, 
the Air-Sea Battle Office, the Joint Staff, and the Services, as well as Echelon 2 and 3 
organizations such as the USAF’s Air Combat Command (ACC), the Navy’s Fleet Forces 
Command (FFC), the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and the Marine 
Corps’ Combat Development Command (MCCDC).  
Authorities 
Players concluded that having the ability to change mission, time, and force (e.g., ‘TACON-
plus’) at the tactical level enabled commanders to rapidly respond and adapt to a wide range of 
missions across the JOA. ‘TACON-plus’ becomes increasingly important when operating in a 
communications denied or degraded environment. During game play, Tier 3 commanders 
routinely delegated ‘TACON-plus’ authority to Tier 4 Commanders because they had perfect 
situational awareness of the battlespace and could coordinate with their peers in real-time. This 
allowed them to quickly adjust, fulfill new requirements, and shift forces to mitigate threats.  
However, several players noted that ‘TACON-plus’ may have served as a “crutch” to 
compensate for the lack of cross-domain expertise required to establish CJTUs during game play. 
On several occasions, Tier 4 execution of combat and sustainment missions became misaligned 
with Tier 3 operational plans. To address this, some participants emphasized that operational 
commanders should retain operational control of forces and identify specific conditions or 
criteria (e.g., communications are denied with higher authority; time, space, or missions) for 
delegating ‘TACON-plus’ to tactical commanders. As one player noted, “OPCON seems right 
for the CCs, with, for the Maritime Command being vested in the senior officer afloat - in this 
construct the CJTUs acts as Officer in Tactical Command with freedom to change or modify 
missions as operational circumstances dictate.”  
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Players concluded that the CJFICC will need to acquire permissions prior to conflict to 
effectively employ cyber and space capabilities to gain and maintain domain access in Phases 0 
and 1. They posited that significant changes to policy and doctrine would need to occur for this 
to come to fruition. As one player noted, “Cyber and space within the CJFICC will need 
permissions prior to conflict or it will have a hard time completing its tasks.” Acquiring these 
permissions requires close and continuous coordination and cooperation between national 
agencies, the combatant commander, JTF Commander, and the CJFICC, as well as tactical cyber 
forces embedded into CJTUs.  
Players concluded that developing a shared understanding of ROE at the tactical level becomes 
more critical when planning and executing cross-domain operations in a communications denied 
or degraded environment. They noted that XDOCEs could play a role in facilitating this 
understanding with peers and subordinates prior to and during a conflict. Finally, players 
emphasized that overcoming culture and doctrine barriers requires joint commanders at every 
level to establish a shared understanding of each service’s viewpoint and act from a common set 
of joint principles that guide the delegation of increased authorities to tactical commanders 
executing missions in an A2/AD environment.  
PDMA: Planning and Directing XDO in an A2/AD Environment  
Players indicated that commanders at all levels of the C2 system need a shared understanding of 
the JTF’s and component commander’s overall plans (e.g., CONOPS and scheme of maneuver), 
as well as their intent and guidance. Moreover, roles and responsibilities and authorities across 
Tier 3 and 4 commanders were often unclear to players. The lack of information sharing up, 
down, and across the C2 system, as well as insufficient detail in both plans and commander’s 
intent and guidance were highlighted by players as the primary barriers to achieving this shared 
understanding across the joint force. Within each campaign phase, players highlighted the need 
to develop a shared understanding of the sequence of operational objectives to achieve the JTF 
commander’s desired end-state and the sequence of cross-domain actions to achieve each 
objective. As one player noted: 
“The CJTU idea is a good solution for a communications degraded environment 
where clear Lines of Operations and operational tasks exist within the context of 
the Commander’s campaign plan. However, since the campaign plan was unclear 
(e.g., phase triggers, end states, transition points, task organizations), the logic 
for having CJTUs was lost.” 
Prior to executing turn zero, the JTF Commander and his component commanders met face-to-
face for an hour to develop the campaign plan. During this meeting, the JTF Commander 
discussed priority and level of effort, primary and intermediate objectives, sequencing of actions, 
and encouraged commanders to discuss their ideas and disseminate plans and guidance at the 60 
percent level, rather than waiting for the 100% solution. One player later noted, “By the 
Admiral’s guidance and intent ...we anticipated bad comms, and we anticipated that Tier 4 had 
better SA. A 60 percent plan is better than a 100 percent plan too late.” While component 
commanders and their staffs had access to the broad campaign plan created from the initial 
planning session, they tended not to share it with their Tier 4 subordinates. As one Tier 4 player 
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noted, “Without a clear understanding of where the CJTF was moving in that - and future - 
moves, long-term unity of effort will not be accomplished.” 
There was a clear disconnect between Tier 3 and Tier 2 commanders related to prioritizing 
missions and level of effort across Tier 3 commanders. Tier 3 commanders looked to the Tier 2 
Commander to prioritize current and future missions and weight of effort, while the Tier 2 
Commander directed Tier 3 Commanders to prioritize their missions and efforts based on the 
overall plan. Players often cited the need to better understand the scheme of maneuver or 
CONOPS of each component commander, most notably the CJFSCC and CJFICC. Developing 
and maintaining this shared understanding may result in less intervention being required by 
higher headquarters to arbitrate competition of resources between Tier 3 commanders and 
potentially Tier 4 commanders. Planning and executing cross- domain operations in a 
communications denied or degraded environment also places greater emphasis on identifying 
and prioritizing information requirements to support commanders at each level. This assertion is 
best reflected by the following player comment: 
“Ironic that now that we want to collaborate more, we won’t have comms. Our 
best tool is our adaptability to the environment ...You’re going to have limited 
widows of communication so talk to your teams and figure out what you want to 
get across and to whom ...if you have an idea that someone else is better suited to 
complete a task, then turn to your boss and tell them that you think they should 
offer it to someone else.” 
The conditions created during the game to degrade communications between commands often 
resulted in confusion and tension between players, as expected. Turn Reports sent from Tier 4 to 
higher headquarters and Integrated Tasking Orders sent from Tier 3 to subordinates were often 
late, missing, or inaccurate. As one player noted, “ITOs were often reworked at Tier 4 because 
assets had moved and weren’t able to accomplish the mission given due to 
range/fuel/sustainment.” This prevented Tier 3 commanders from developing a shared 
understanding of Blue-Red force laydown and the results of past combat and sustainment 
missions in order to accurately develop future plans and orders. Lastly, players advocated for an 
ITO that provides awareness of requirements across the force to support intelligence analysis, 
targeting, apportionment, and execution. One player noted, “We have to adjust things on the fly 
because there isn’t a common ITO at the Tier 3 level that they can share with us. If we could get 
the CJFACC/CJFMCC picture early on, it would preclude us attempting to do this on our own 
through personal networking.”  
Planning and intent and guidance were discussed in 33% of the qualitative data coded and 
analyzed. This observation is not surprising since planners and operators rely on intent and 
guidance from higher authority to execute missions. The players offered that planners at every 
level of command - perhaps most importantly at the Tier 4 level - need a clear and common 
understanding of the JTF and Functional Component Commanders’ intent and their Concept of 
Operations across the campaign. Planning and executing cross-domain operations in an A2/AD 
environment places greater emphasis on commanders, starting at the JTF level, to prioritize 
missions and level of effort across the force, prioritize and sequence cross-domain actions and 
effects, identify the degree of latitude in departure from orders, delineate authorities and 
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responsibilities between commanders, and discuss what to do in the event of a communications 
failure. As one player noted,  
“We believe we have a need and right to increasingly available real-time 
information and we are modifying our processes to flexible but vulnerable “just 
in time” mechanisms. If we don’t have a solid backup plan and mechanisms 
(and trained people to use this plan), we will be dead in the water.” 
In a communications denied or degraded environment, prioritizing missions and level of 
effort becomes increasingly important for tactical commanders. As one Tier 4 player noted, 
“If there is one thing the Tier 3 could provide it would be the weight of effort. If we can focus on 
specific missions, we will figure out what we need. We’re getting ITOs where everything is 
wrong and if you have given us the authorities, give me the weight of effort.” Continuously 
requesting approval increases time spent planning, directing, monitoring, and assessing 
operations in a time compressed decision cycle. As one player noted, “We (Tier 4) felt we had 
enough authorities, but as we tried to cross authorities (CJFACC/CJFMCC) we had issues 
because we needed to check with Tier 3. Trying to change priority levels in real time is 
challenging and limited our ability to achieve our objectives.” 
Players recognized that clarifying intent and guidance becomes increasingly difficult in a 
communications denied or degraded environment so it is critical that commanders and their 
staffs develop a shared understanding with their superiors, subordinates and peers prior to a 
conflict. As a result, players identified the need to educate and train leaders at all levels of 
command to practice writing and interpreting effective intent and guidance through joint 
education and training exercises. As one player noted:  
“Clear and concise phrasing of Command intent is an essential skill to enable 
mission command…we may need to reach back to some of the great 
commanders of the past and understand how they phrased their orders - 
something perhaps that we have forgotten in recent years when we have been 
able to saturate our subordinates with plans, lists and spreadsheets.” 
Finally, players concluded that intent and guidance should discuss “domain hopping” or the “Red 
and Blue trip wires” that would cause horizontal and vertical escalation across domains, and 
Blue actions to deescalate or deter further RED escalation within each domain. One player said, 
“Give them (subordinate and peer commanders) the off ramp to STOP, down to setting-up 
conditions for freedom of maneuver…” Players noted that future analysis and gaming 
efforts are warranted to explore how operational deterrence and escalation of actions across 
all five domains – land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace interrelate against an advanced 
A2/AD adversary.  
Players concluded that current C2 processes and products (e.g., control orders and tasking 
orders) at the Tier 3 and 4 levels are insufficient to coordinate cross-domain requirements, 
effects, and capabilities to prevent fratricide and mitigate mission overlaps and gaps. They 
emphasized that commanders at all levels of command must develop and maintain a common 
understanding of all five domains on a near-real time basis and possess the expertise internally to 
their staff to monitor and assess cross-domain operations. Players concluded that cross-domain 
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based assessments, control orders, and tasking orders should be developed to compensate for the 
lack of cross-domain products in place today. They also emphasized that common indicators or 
measures of effectiveness should be developed to assess the effects of cross-domain operations 
on mission accomplishment.  
Specifically, players noted that current battlespace control measures, such as the Air Control 
Order (ACO) and Waterspace Management Plan, are necessary but probably insufficient to 
provide commanders with the required battlespace control required to fight effectively in all five 
domains without significant fratricide. Each domain will require control orders, and these orders 
will need to be integrated and made available to every functional component – and their 
subordinate commanders – who have forces operating in those domains. While current service 
and joint planning processes do not prevent planners from taking a domain-based approach to 
campaign planning, with a focus on domain access and the ability to project power to achieve 
effects, participants suggested that current planning processes at the Tier 3 and 4 levels should be 
modified to include the use of cross-domain assessments. While XDOCEs at each level of 
command would most likely perform these functions, players agreed that tactical commanders 
assume more responsibility to monitor and assess domain access and risk in an A2/AD 
environment.  
Even though the game chat function, like other communications paths, experienced delays due to 
enemy action, the Tier 3 players continued to rely on it to coordinate plan, direct, monitor, and 
assess cross-domain operations throughout the game. Players concluded that chat provided the 
high-level of communication and coordination necessary to prevent fratricide and improve multi-
domain awareness at the Tier 3 level. They noted that improving access and interoperability 
between service chat forums is paramount to rapid decision-making in a high-paced A2/AD 
environment. Players agreed that Tier 2, 3, and 4 XDOCEs and traditional planners should 
operate within the same chat forum to prevent overlaps and gaps in mission planning and build 
broader multi-domain awareness.  
XDO C2 IMPLICATIONS FOR INTELLIGENCE 
While not an area of focus in the game, an effort was made to examine the impact that XDO 
C2, in particular the 4 new attributes, would have on existing intelligence processes and 
procedures. Resulting from that effort, players noted that collecting, analyzing, and 
disseminating relevant, timely, and actionable intelligence to joint planners and operators 
becomes problematic when communications are denied and degraded. They concluded that 
current intelligence processes and command relationships may be insufficient to effectively 
support cross-domain planning at the tactical and operational levels, as well as planning and 
directing intelligence operations. Players emphasized that an overreliance on national 
intelligence products and platforms lengthens the time required for decision-making and 
places forces in theater at a disadvantage. The genesis and implication of this assertion is 
best characterized by the following player quote: 
“This is borne of decades of information superiority, permissive environments, 
and CONUS as a sanctuary. We’ll need to go “back to the future” and start to 
live with denied comms, unavailable Intel, and providing initiative via mission 
command to lower level commanders. The ISR / Intel ‘Monster’, as it 
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currently exists, will not be able to properly function in a contested 
environment.”  
To mitigate this shortfall, players concluded that CJTU Commanders should maintain 
organic tactical ISR capabilities to collect, analyze, and disseminate information and 
intelligence to provide tactical indications and warnings and force protection intelligence to 
enable CJTU Commanders to conduct cross-domain operations across a range of missions. 
They highlighted the need to identify intelligence and information requirements of the 
XDOCE, CJTU, CJFICC, and CJFSCC, how each of the services would integrate national 
and theater intelligence capabilities, and who retains command authority of service and 
theater ISR assets to support the four C2 attributes. Players also emphasized that current 
intelligence assessments and estimates of adversary intentions, capabilities, and COAs may need 
to be refined and tailored to meet operational and tactical commanders’ needs. Given the need 
for intelligence support at each level of command, players suggested that intelligence planners 
should be fully integrated with the XDOCE, CJTU, CJFICC, and CJFSCC to support the 
development of the overall campaign plan, desired cross-domain effects, and cross-domain 
measures of mission success. It was assumed that standardizing intelligence protocols, processes, 
and procedures will help intelligence planners identify intelligence requirements, plan and direct 
intelligence operations, process and analyze information, and produce and disseminate the 
intelligence products needed to effectively support the XDOCE, CJTU, CJFICC, and CJFSCC.  
Finally, players emphasized that significant changes to service and joint doctrine, education, 
training, and career progression would be necessary to support cross-domain planning at the 
tactical and operational levels, as well as planning and directing intelligence operations. They 
highlighted that intelligence planners need to develop a broader and deeper level of joint 
expertise and experience related to joint intelligence capabilities and limitations, joint campaign 
planning and design, and how an adversary would deny friendly forces sanctuary and freedom of 
maneuver by employing cross-domain operations to disrupt, destroy, and defeat friendly forces 
within the operational environment. Players posited that developing and maintaining a cadre of 
joint intelligence planners and operators that specialize in supporting XDOCE planning and 
CJTU operations requires joint education and training earlier in their careers. This expertise not 
only supports the development of intelligence processes and products, but it may help 
intelligence planners challenge current planning assumptions and provide alternative 
perspectives. 
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations 
While the ASB concept highlights the need to command and control cross-domain operations 
which are joint, networked, and integrated, no organizational structure is proposed; only the 
requirement that any suitable structure must be capable of tight, real-time coordination. 
Establishing unity of effort among joint and combined forces engaged in cross-domain 
operations against an advanced A2/AD adversary can be complex and challenging. Doing so in a 
communications degraded or denied environment requires commanders to exercise authority and 
direction over assigned and attached forces in real time while critical information, systems and 
services are reduced or prevented. To attain the level of speed and coordination required to 
outpace the adversary, a commander must be able to quickly direct and control forces operating 
in the air, maritime, land, space and cyberspace domains.  
Hard choices must be made in allocating limited resources while executing joint cross-domain 
operations in an A2/AD environment, and the same is true when it comes to continuing to 
develop and explore the concept of XDO. Therefore, the joint community should officially 
designate a lead organization responsible for XDO development and implementation. While this 
has been de facto the ASB Office, the joint community should determine whether they or another 
service or joint organization, such as the Joint Staff J7, is best suited to officially lead this effort. 
This organization should develop an XDO Concept document in order to build a common 
understanding of what cross-domain operations are, why they are important, and the challenges 
of conducting them. Such a concept document should provide the justification for XDO C2 and 
the associated CONOPS. Concurrently, that lead should oversee the continued development of 
the XDO C2 CONOPS, to include the incorporation of the recommendations contained in this 
report. 
Regarding the 4 C2 attributes, whose examination was the focus of this year’s Global effort: 
? The CJFICC should be implemented now, but solely as a Cyber Component 
Commander, under the lead of USCYBERCOM, and leveraging the results of other 
ongoing Cyber C2 efforts. In addition, work should continue to evaluate whether the 
Space domain and/or Information Operations would benefit from a dedicated 
component commander. 
? Both the XDOCE and CJTU should be pursued through the development of detailed 
implementation plans that include incorporation into joint and combined war games and 
exercises (Both of these attributes, along with the CJFICC, were intended to be 
examined in the Air Force’s Unified Engagement’14 Title 10 War Game, which took 
place in Hawaii in January, 2015). 
? The CJFSCC is not ready to move forward, as it requires further evaluation to determine 
whether it contains sufficient utility to warrant further development and implementation.
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VI. Annexes and Supplemental Data 
ANNEX A: PLAYER MANNING BY CELL 
 
Billet Rank Service Country Command 
CJTF CDR RADM USN US COMNAVSURFLANT 
Deputy CJTF CDR RDML USN US INSURV 
CJTF XDOCE CAPT USN US OPNAV N3N5- ASB 
CJTF Air SME Wg Cdr RAF UK RAF Air Warfare Centre 
CJTF Air SME Col USAF US HQ AF/CVAR 
CJTF Cyber SME CAPT USN US Joint Staff, J5 Cyber Policy Division 
CJTF Intel SME CIV USN US Naval War College 
CJTF XO MAJ USA US TRADOC 
CJTF Maritime SME CIV USCG US USCG HQ 
CJTF Maritime SME CDR USN US COMUSFLTFORCOM 
CJTF Land SME CAPT USA US EWCT/Futures Directorate 
CJTF SOF SME CIV DOD US USSOCOM 
MCC Capt RN UK UK Maritime Warfare Centre 
MCC Maritime SME CAPT USN US OPNAV N3N5- ASB 
MCC Maritime SME CAPT JMSDF JPN Maritime Staff Office/JMSDF 
MCC Maritime SME Cdr RN UK UK Maritime Warfare Centre  
MCC Naval Intel SME CDR USN US NAVCYBERFOR/IDFOR 
MCC Naval Sub SME CMDR RAN AUS UK Maritime Warfare Centre 
MCC Naval TACAIR CDR USN US OPNAV N98 
MCC Air XDOCE WGCDR RAAF AUS USAF ACC / 505th Training Group  
MCC Cyber XDOCE Maj MoD UK Joint Force Cyber Group 
MCC Land XDOCE CIV USA US FWD, ARCIC, TRADOC 
MCC Maritime 
XDOCE 
LCDR USN US COMSEVENTHFLT 
MCC Space XDOCE Maj USAF US HQ USAF / SAF-SP 
ACC CIV USAF US OPNAV N3N5- ASB 
ACC Air SME LtCol USAF US AFGSC/A8P 
ACC Air SME CIV USAF US HQ AF / A5XS Wargaming 
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Billet Rank Service Country Command 
ACC Air SME LCDR JMSDF JPN Japan MSDF LNO OPNAV N51 
ACC Air SME LCDR USN US NWDC 
ACC Air Intel SME Maj USAF US AF/A2D 
ACC Army Msl Def 
SME 
CIV USA US Army SMDC/ARSTRAT 
ACC Air XDOCE CIV USN US NWDC 
ACC Cyber XDOCE LCdr RCN CAN CNavy/Director of Naval Strategy 
ACC Land XDOCE Lt Col RM UK UK Joint Forces Command 
ACC Maritime 
XDOCE 
CDR JMSDF JPN NWDC JMSDF PEP 
ACC Space XDOCE CIV USAF US HQ USAF/A5XS 
ICC CAPT USN US FCC/C10F 
ICC Intel SME CDR USN US FCC/C10F 
ICC Joint Cyber SME CIV USA US Army Cyber Center of Excellence 
ICC Joint Cyber SME Lt Col USMC US MARFORCYBERCOM 
ICC USAF Space 
SME 
Col USAF US PACAF/A3/6 
ICC USN Space SME LCDR USN US COMTENTHFLT/FLTCYBERCOM 
ICC Air XDOCE Col JASDF JPN Air Staff Office/Japan Air Self Defense Force 
ICC Land XDOCE CIV USA US ARCIC/JACD 
ICC Maritime XDOCE CMDR RAN AUS Royal Australian Navy 
LCC COL USA US Mission Command Battle Lab 
LCC Ground Intel 
SME 
CIV USA US US Army TRADOC/DCS, G-2 
LCC Land Domain 
SME 
Lt Col USMC US HQMC I&L 
SOF SME MAJ USA US SOCOM 
LCC Air XDOCE Lcol RCAF CAN 1 Canadian Air Division HQ 
LCC Cyber XDOCE CMDR RAN AUS Royal Australian Navy 
LCC Maritime XDOCE Cdr RCN CAN CNavy /Director Naval Strategy 
LCC Space XDOCE MAJ RCAF CAN SAF/SP 
SCC  LTC USA US CADD / MC CoE 
SCC Air Log SME CIV USAF US AMC 
SCC Combat Eng 
SME 
CDR USN US NECC 
SCC Ground Log 
SME 
CIV USA US US Army TRADOC 
SCC Intel SME CIV USMC US MCIA 
SCC Joint Log SME Cdr RN UK British Defence Staff 
SCC Naval Log SME CAPT USN US OPNAV N41 
SCC Naval Log SME LCDR USN US COMPACFLT 
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Billet Rank Service Country Command 
SCC Air XDOCE LtCol USAF US ACC/A3F Joint Integration 
SCC Land XDOCE LTC AA AUS HQ TRADOC 
SCC Maritime 
XDOCE 
CDR USN US NAVCENT / CMF 
ACC Tier 4 CIV USAF US AF/A8X 
ACC Tier 4 LtCol USAF US Air Combat Command 
ACC Tier 4 CIV USAF US Air Combat Command 
ACC Tier 4 Lt Col USMC US OPNAV N98 
ICC Tier 4 LtCol USAF US AF/A5XS 
ICC Tier 4 LtCol USAF US HAF/A3S 
LCC Tier 4 Maj USAF US PACAF A3/6/C2 
LCC Tier 4 MAJ USA US TRADOC, JACD 
MCC Tier 4 LCDR USN US COMSUBLANT 
MCC Tier 4 LT USN US MCWL Wargaming 
MCC Tier 4 Lt Col USMC US CD&I / SID 
MCC Tier 4 CMDR RAN AUS Royal Australian Navy 
SCC Tier 4 CIV USAF US AMC/Strategic Planning Division 
SCC Tier 4 LCDR USN US USFF N413 
HHQ  CDR USN US JS J7 
HHQ  CIV USCG US USCG HQ 
HHQ  CIV DoD US JS J7 FJFD JWD 
HHQ CIV DoD US JS J7 JWD 
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